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Abstract
This thesis looks at the use of key recovery primarily from the perspective of business
needs, as opposed to the needs of governments or regulatory bodies.
The threats that necessitate the use of key recovery as a countermeasure are identified
together with the requirements for a key recovery mechanism deployed in a business
environment. The applicability of mechanisms (mainly designed for law enforcement
access purposes) is also examined. What follows from this analysis is that whether the
target data is being communicated or archived can influence the criticality of some of
the identified requirements.
As a result, key recovery mechanisms used for archived data need to be distinguished
from those used for communicated data, and the different issues surrounding those two
categories are further investigated. Two mechanisms specifically designed for use on
archived data are proposed.
An investigation is also carried out regarding the interoperability of dissimilar key
recovery mechanisms, when these are used for encrypted communicated data. We
study a scheme proposed by the Key Recovery Alliance to promote interoperability
between dissimilar mechanisms and we show that it fails to achieve one of its objectives.
Instead, a negotiation protocol is proposed where the communicating parties can agree
on a mutually acceptable or different, yet interoperable, key recovery mechanism(s).
The issue of preventing unfair key recovery by either of two communicating parties,
where one of the parties activates a covert channel for key recovery by a third party, is
also investigated. A protocol is proposed that can prevent this. This protocol can also
be used as a certification protocol for Diffie-Hellman keys in cases where neither the
user nor the certification authority are trusted to generate the user’s key on their own.
Finally, we study the use of key recovery in one of the authentication protocols pro-
posed in the context of third generation mobile communications. We propose certain
modifications that give it a key recovery capability in an attempt to assist its in-
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation and challenges
In recent years, key recovery has captured the attention of information security spe-
cialists as well as government officials and the public. It has been one of the most
controversial issues in the information security area.
With increasing demands for the use of encryption on communications, governments
have sought routes to lawful access to encrypted data while allowing the use of strong
encryption. This lawful access was intended to serve the purpose of dealing with
serious crime and for national security reasons. From the government perspective, key
escrow gives a means of access to encrypted data. This solution, however, has caused
widespread opposition as it has been seen as a potential infringement of the rights of
individuals.
Key recovery, and more specifically key escrow, first gained publicity from the United
States government’s proposal for compulsory escrow of keys [70]. It was part of this
government’s plan to relax export restrictions on cryptographic products that employ
strong encryption. The result was the proposal of a key escrow scheme, namely the
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) or Clipper, which provides users with strong en-
cryption for their communications, and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) with access
to users’ encrypted communications when authorised. The latter, however, reinforced
opposition arising from possible threats to privacy.
Key recovery apart from fulfilling LEAs demands for access to encrypted communi-
cations, is likely to be an essential tool for businesses and organisations that want to
ensure continuous access to their encrypted data. Businesses cannot tolerate denial
of access to their data due to loss of access to decryption keys as the lost data could
be of considerable value. Key recovery in a business environment should therefore be
considered as part of routine disaster recovery planning.
16
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Although much work has been done regarding key recovery mechanisms, the majority
of it has been in the context of providing sound key recovery mechanisms that meet gov-
ernment demands for lawful access. There is little published material on key recovery
mechanisms and their benefits when they are applied in a business environment. How-
ever, through the process of seeking sound mechanisms for law enforcement demands,
schemes that serve business requirements have also started to emerge. As in any im-
mature market, the existence of proprietary mechanisms has caused problems, such
as interoperability issues among dissimilar schemes, that have not been thoroughly
investigated. Moreover, the design of most of these mechanisms has focused on en-
crypted communications without taking into account their use for encrypted archived
data or, at least, the different requirements that surround key recovery mechanisms
when deployed for communicated and for archived data. Therefore, interoperability
of dissimilar mechanisms and key recovery schemes for archived data are among the
issues that urgently need further investigation.
The Key Recovery Alliance is an international industry group that was founded by
eleven major information technology vendors in 1996 (by the end of 1997 more than
60 companies had joined the group). It was set up to develop high-level cryptographic
“key-recovery” solutions that meet the requirements of business for strong encryption
and could allow easing of restrictions of cryptographic import/export around the world.
Among the aims of the alliance was to provide some kind of standardisation for key re-
covery mechanisms, with a particular focus on interoperability issues. However, public
opposition to the general notion of key recovery restricted the Key Recovery Alliance’s
activities and, in a particular case, even forced a company to withdraw from the al-
liance. Key recovery was something that nobody wanted to talk about, regardless of
the environment in which it was to be used, and this seemed to have an effect on the
work carried out by the Key Recovery Alliance. It is worth mentioning, however, that
almost all the companies that provide cryptographic solutions incorporate some-kind
of proprietary key recovery within their products, not necessarily for LEA demands
but for the end user. This is an indication that businesses, which must safeguard their
17
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encrypted assets from loss of privately held keys, are starting to see key recovery as an
essential tool, which must exist in their cryptographic products.
1.2 Contribution of this thesis
This thesis investigates certain issues that surround key recovery mechanisms when
deployed specifically in a business environment. It looks at this topic entirely from the
business perspective without considering LEA requirements.
A thorough analysis of the requirements that a key recovery mechanism should fulfil
when deployed in a business environment is given, and an investigation of the appli-
cability of existing mechanisms follows. What follows from this investigation is that
the nature of the target data, i.e. whether the mechanism is used for communicated or
archived data, can influence the criticality of the requirements. Such an investigation
was considered necessary as businesses wishing to use key recovery have to be aware
of the advantages and disadvantages of deploying a mechanism that was designed to
serve law enforcement access.
The identification of different requirements for communicated and archived data has
motivated research for a mechanism that can be deployed specifically for archived
data. Two mechanisms of this type are proposed, one of which is an adaptation of a
mechanism proposed by Maher in [53]. The mechanisms meet different requirements,
with the main distinction being that one of them requires the existence of an on-line
key recovery agent during key generation, which helps counter rogue user attacks.
The work within this thesis was carried out in parallel with the work of the Key
Recovery Alliance, and the results of the latter’s work have been closely monitored.
In particular, consideration was given to the solution that the Key Recovery Alliance
has proposed to solve the interoperability problems between dissimilar key recovery
mechanisms. It is shown that the proposed model has some flaws and does not achieve
18
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what the alliance promises. Therefore, further research on this important topic is
necessary. A solution is proposed for the interoperability problem that arises from
the use of dissimilar mechanisms incorporated within various cryptographic solutions.
The proposed scheme gives the communicating parties the ability to negotiate the key
recovery mechanism(s) to be used, thus avoiding the situation where the two entities
are unable to establish a secure association because of interoperability issues between
the corresponding key recovery mechanisms.
This thesis is not primarily concerned with potential government requirements for law
enforcement access. However, in Chapter 9 a solution is proposed that allows law
enforcement access to encrypted telecommunications; this was done to help the inter-
national deployment of the ASPeCT (Advanced Security for Personal Communications
Technology [2]) protocol bearing in mind potential government demands for compul-
sory deployment of key recovery mechanisms. The objective was to put a mechanism
in place that will guarantee time-bounded interception and protect users against unau-
thorised access to their communications.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is divided into five parts. Part I introduces the concepts and principles of key
recovery mechanisms and investigates the requirements of a key recovery mechanism
deployed in a business environment. More specifically, Chapter 2 gives an introduction
to key recovery mechanisms. It introduces the concept of key recovery and explains
how key recovery mechanisms work using selected examples of mechanisms proposed
by both the commercial sector and academia. Chapter 3 outlines the requirements for
a key recovery mechanism when deployed specifically in a business environment, as
opposed to the use of a key recovery mechanism for law enforcement access. Within
this chapter the need for distinction between key recovery mechanisms for archived and
for communicated data is outlined, while a thorough investigation of these two classes
19
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follows in Parts II and III respectively.
Part II covers key recovery mechanisms specifically deployed for archived data. In
Chapter 4 the requirements of such a key recovery mechanism are described and an
analysis of the applicability of existing mechanisms follows. Moreover, two new mecha-
nisms are proposed which fulfil the identified requirements. The first one is a variant of
Maher’s mechanism described in [53], which avoids certain problems. Chapter 5 gives
the details of a prototype implementation of this scheme.
Part III covers issues surrounding key recovery mechanisms for communicated data and
more specifically investigates interoperability of key recovery mechanisms. Chapter
6 gives an introduction to the interoperability problem that dissimilar key recovery
mechanisms might face in encrypted communications and identifies those factors that
can cause interoperability problems using a detailed description of a key recovery model.
Within this chapter, a scheme proposed by the Key Recovery Alliance as a solution to
the interoperability problem is also investigated and the reasons why this scheme fails
to achieve its objectives are explained. In Chapter 7, a protocol for negotiating the
key recovery mechanism(s) to be used by two communicating parties is described. This
protocol aims to help overcome the interoperability problems that might arise from the
intention of two communicating parties to use dissimilar key recovery mechanisms.
Part IV of this thesis looks at key recovery from a different perspective, namely the pre-
vention of unfair key recovery by either of two communicating parties. More specifically,
it looks at one of the standardised key agreement mechanisms of ISO/IEC 11770-3 [38]
and considers the problem that either party might influence the generated key, while
activating a covert channel for key recovery by a third party. The protocol proposed as
a countermeasure can also be used as a certification protocol for Diffie-Hellman keys.
Finally, Part V gives an introduction to the ASPeCT authentication and initialisation
of payment (AIP) protocols and describes certain modifications that give them a key re-
20
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covery capability. The modified protocols enable time-bounded law enforcement access
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The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of key recovery mechanisms. Some of
the various types are illustrated with selected examples that have been proposed by
both the commercial sector and academia. Attacks that seek to defeat the objective
of key recovery, and weaknesses introduced into the security infrastructure by the use
of key recovery, are also described, together with some techniques that can be used as
countermeasures.
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2.1 Data protection and key recovery
The dependence of organisations and enterprises on the global information infrastruc-
ture for conducting business with their partners or consumers is increasing very rapidly.
Information has become one of the most valuable assets of a corporation, and hence the
need for protection of this information has emerged. This underlines the importance
of the security mechanisms used for the protection of sensitive information to prevent
loss of proprietary data and to safeguard its integrity.
Among the protection mechanisms used are cryptographic techniques, which can help
guarantee the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information. Key manage-
ment techniques exist for the cryptographic keys used, covering the generation, distri-
bution, validation, update, storage, usage, and destruction of keys. Key management
techniques should, however, also deal with situations where keys become forgotten,
damaged, rendered unavailable, or authorised third party access is required. Key re-
covery, backup and archival are techniques that can be used for this purpose.
Key backup refers to the backup of key material in independent, secure storage media,
during operational use. Key archival is a form of backup where the target keys are no
longer in normal use. It refers to long-term storage of post-operational keys and is used
for key retrieval under special conditions, such as settling disputes involving repudia-
tion. Both key archival and backup can be considered as key recovery techniques.
Although the term key recovery lacks a precise definition, and its interpretation may
vary, within the context of this thesis key recovery (KR) is defined as the process
that enables authorised entities to recover decryption keys, when they are not other-
wise available, with the ultimate goal of recovering the plaintext from encrypted data.
This process is typically an integral part of the key management infrastructure and is
achieved through reconstruction and/or retrieval of the target key. Related terms that
have been used in the literature include key escrow, encryption control, commercial key
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recovery, cryptographic backup and recovery, virtual addressing, and key encapsulation,
which are defined differently by various communities of interest and have poorly de-
fined differences. We use the terms key escrow and key encapsulation to describe two
fundamentally different approaches to key recovery.
One of the most critical components of a key recovery mechanism (KRM) is a key
recovery agent (KRA), which is a trusted third party (TTP) that assists in the recovery
of keys by preserving the appropriate key material. The KRA can be external or
internal to an organisation, with associated advantages and disadvantages (these are
described in detail in Chapter 3). Trust in the KRA is obviously a crucial requirement,
as the KRA will potentially hold the key to all the users’ encrypted information. If the
KRA becomes corrupted or changes its policy, the users’ privacy is endangered.
Alternative names for the KRA that have been used in the literature include key recov-
ery centre (KRC), data recovery centre, key escrow agent or even just agent. Through-
out this thesis these terms are considered synonymous, unless specifically distinguished,
although there is a trend to use the term key escrow agent only for key escrow mecha-
nisms.
2.2 An abstract model of a key recovery mechanism
An abstract model of a key recovery mechanism is depicted in Figure 2.1. This is a
functional model, depicting the processes of a key recovery mechanism while emphasis is
given to the entities that are involved. A similar model has been described by Denning
in [17] and an entirely functional model can be found in [42].
The entities that are typically involved are the KRA and the two communicating par-
ties, namely A and B, unless the mechanism is used for archived data in which case
only A will be present (the ciphertext together with the potential key recovery field are
simply sent to a storage device). The Authorised entity within whose domain the data
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recovery takes place can be any entity authorised to recover encrypted data, such as
the corporation management, or the user that encrypted the data. 
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Figure 2.1: A typical KRM
In the model, A will encrypt the plaintext data with the session key K producing the
ciphertext. A will also generate the key recovery field (KRF), which is information that
can be interpreted by the Key Recovery Process.
The recovery of the target keys is performed by the Key Recovery Process. This
might be part of the KRA’s or the Authorised entity’s functionality (the latter possi-
bility applies when the key recovery material is dispersed among multiple agents; e.g.
the Escrowed Encryption Standard [70]). The Key Recovery Process takes as input
information necessary for this process, namely ‘KR information’, which has the form
of a key recovery field (KRF) or KR material. The KRF represents KR information
generated by either or both communicating parties while the KR material can include
cryptographic values that A escrows with KRA, or KRA’s own key material essential
for the recovery of the requested keys.
For simplicity reasons, only one KRA is shown, which is assumed to be the one with
which entity A is associated. Although interaction between A’s and B’s KRAs can take
place during any of the communication phases, it is not shown in the figure as inter-
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TTP communication is beyond the scope of the model given here. No communication,
however, takes place between an entity and the peer’s KRA unless the two entities
share the same KRA. Finally, note that A might be associated with multiple KRAs, in
which case the KR material is distributed among them.
2.3 Recoverable keys
For the purposes of this thesis we assume that the target keys that can be recovered
using a KRM are keys used by a cryptographic mechanism deployed for data confiden-
tiality (i.e. a cipher mechanism). Note that, in any event, it is usually considered bad
practice to give third parties access to signature keys. If a user’s private signing key is
lost then a new key pair can be generated, and use of cryptographic mechanisms can
continue uninterrupted without loss of service. Of course, if a user’s private signature
key is compromised, then different problems arise, but this is outside the scope of the
thesis.
The situation, however, is rather different for private decryption keys for a public
key cryptosystem. Third party access to private decryption keys is often necessary, a
property that strongly suggests the maintenance of separate key pairs for signatures
and for encryption.
Regarding the nature of the target keys, there are typically the following possibilities:
• Data decryption keys. These keys are used directly for the decryption of the
encrypted data, and include session keys for encrypted communications and file
keys.
• Master keys or key decryption keys. These keys typically enable access to multiple
data encryption keys, e.g. master keys used for encrypting multiple session keys.
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Given that the current trend is the deployment of symmetric ciphers for data encryp-
tion, while public-key cryptosystems are used for key management purposes, through-
out this thesis it is assumed that the data decryption keys are those used by symmetric
ciphers unless otherwise stated. In this context, the term “encryption key” will also
denote the decryption key of the target data.
2.4 Classification of key recovery mechanisms
Although many categories have been introduced for the classification of KRMs (see [83])
key recovery mechanisms can typically be divided into key escrow or key encapsulation
mechanisms.
In a typical key escrow mechanism, an escrow agent holds a copy of all or part of the
user’s keys (either data or key encryption keys). In [66] a key escrow mechanism is
described as a method of KR in which “the secret or private keys, key parts, or key-
related information to be recovered are stored by one or more key escrow agents”. As a
result, each user has to escrow directly with his agent his private keys, or each session
key that he uses. A typical key escrow agent could be an on-line TTP acting as a key
distribution centre (KDC) or a key translation centre (KTC), which keeps a copy of all
keys that the user establishes. Variants of key escrow mechanisms exist and some of
them are described in [83].
In another scenario, the user escrows an initial value, namely a Master Key, with his
agent, which is subsequently used for the generation of all session keys (for example
using a hash function and a time-stamp). A further alternative is when the user escrows
with his agent the private key of an asymmetric key pair that can be used to compute
the secret session keys [28]. An example of the latter is the JMW scheme [39, 40, 41]
which is described in detail in Section 2.5.1.2. As can been seen from the above, a
wide range of KR solutions can be classified as key escrow mechanisms. All of them
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are characterised by the storage of key-related information with a trusted agent that
gives the latter the ability to recover all the user’s decryption keys.
In a typical key encapsulation mechanism, the user encloses the KR information (e.g.
session keys or key parts) in an encrypted KR block that is made available to the
agent(s) with which the user is associated, and which can be decrypted only by this
agent(s). The KR information is typically encrypted using the agent’s public encryption
key, and attached to the encrypted data as a key recovery field (KRF) [91]. In a more
general definition, [66], a key encapsulation mechanism is described as “a method of key
recovery in which keys, key parts, or key related information are encrypted specifically
for the KRA function and associated with the encrypted data”, where the KRA function
is “a key recovery system function that performs a recovery service in response to an
authorised request”.
There are also KR mechanisms that are difficult to categorise into one of the above two
classes. There are, for instance, key escrow schemes that also require the transmission
of a KRF for the KRA to be able to recover the keys. An example is a KRM where
the user escrows his private decryption key with his agent, and uses the public key for
the transmission of any key related material. Such a scheme can be considered as a
hybrid mechanism, but it can also be classified as a key escrow scheme since it involves
escrowing key-related material, regardless of the transmission of a KRF. There are also
key encapsulation schemes for which the KRF is not restricted to the transmission
of session keys encrypted under the KRA’s public encryption key. As an example,
consider the KRM proposed by Maher in [53]. Although the author claims that the
proposed scheme is a key escrow mechanism, using the above definition the scheme
should be classified as a key encapsulation mechanism, since the user does not escrow
any key material with his KRA but instead makes this information available to the
KRA function.
A KRM that cannot be classified under these two categories is weak encryption, which
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is identified in [45] as an encryption control system. For the purposes of this thesis,
however, we do not consider this as a type of KRM as it contradicts one of the basic
requirements for a KRM deployed in a business environment (see Chapter 3), which is
that the deployed KRM should not weaken security and, more specifically, the cryp-
tographic mechanisms used. Besides that, and as mentioned in [45], this type of key
recovery is unlikely to be attractive to any of the interested entities, i.e. users and/or
corporations.
2.5 Examples
In this section we consider some representative examples of KRMs proposed either by
industry or academia.
2.5.1 Key escrow
2.5.1.1 The US Escrowed Encryption Standard
The US Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) [70] was developed and standardised by
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a division of the US
Department of Commerce. EES is probably the most well-known and controversial
key escrow mechanism. It was designed to provide decryption of encrypted sensitive
but unclassified communicated data, when their interception is lawfully authorised.
For the purposes of this standard, data includes digitised voice, fascimile or computer
information communicated in a telephone system.
The EES is implemented on a tamper-resistant hardware chip. Two devices have been
produced for this purpose: Clipper and Capstone. The EES standard is based on a
NSA-designed algorithm called SKIPJACK [82], and a method that allows for govern-
ment access through a chip unique key and a Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF)
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transmitted with the encrypted communications. For this purpose, the following ele-
ments are included in the chip.
1. The SKIPJACK encryption algorithm.
2. An 80-bit family key KF that is common to all chips.
3. A chip unique identifier (UID).
4. An 80-bit chip unique key KU, which is the exclusive-or (XOR) of two 80-bit chip
unique key components (KU1 and KU2).
5. Specialized control software.
Prior to the use of EES, an initialisation phase takes place, where two government-
approved escrow agents generate key components KU1 and KU2 respectively, which
are bitwise XORed to form the chip unique key KU, i.e. KU = KU1 ⊕ KU2. The
key components are encrypted with the escrow agents’ secret key encrypting keys and
escrowed along with the chip identifier UID. In particular, KU1 is encrypted with
the key encrypting key K1, assigned to escrow agent 1, to produce EK1(KU1), where
EK(X) denotes encryption of X with key K. Similarly, KU2 is encrypted with K2,
which is assigned to escrow agent 2, to produce EK2(KU2).
The mechanism. Two entities that wish to communicate using a security device that
contains an escrowed encryption chip should first establish an 80-bit session key KS,
which will be used to encrypt the communications. Once KS is established, it is passed
to the chip and the LEAF generation method is invoked. The 128-bit LEAF consists
of the 32-bit UID, the session key KS encrypted with KU, and a 16-bit checksum,
which is computed using the session key and an initialisation vector (IV) (which may
be generated by the chip). The LEAF, encrypted with the unique family key KF, and
the IV are then transmitted, together with the encrypted data, to the receiving entity
as shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Escrowed Encryption Standard
Warranted interception. Lawful interception of communications that take place
on a particular line is feasible after the authorised entity has obtained a court order
to intercept it. The court order is passed to the telecommunications service provider
in order to get access to the communications associated with that line. As described
in [13], if encrypted communication is detected “the incoming line will be set up to
pass through a special government-controlled decrypt device” as shown in Figure 2.2.
“The decrypt device will recognize communications encrypted with a key escrow chip,
extract the LEAF and IV, and decrypt the LEAF using the family key KF in order to
pull out the chip identifier UID and the encrypted session key EKU (KS).”
The chip identifier will be given to the escrow agents along with the request for the
corresponding key components, documentation that certifies the authorisation of the
surveillance, and the serial number of the decrypt device. In response to the request,
the escrow agents will release the corresponding key components to the authorised
entity. These components will then be used to form the key KU, as required to decrypt
KS.
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2.5.1.2 The JMW scheme
Another representative example of key escrow is the JMW scheme [39, 40, 41], named
after its three inventors: Jefferies, Mitchell, and Walker. It is based on the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange algorithm, [20], and is “intended to provide warranted access to
user communications” via the TTPs with which the two communicating parties A and
B are associated (TA and TB correspondingly).
Prior to use of the mechanism, an initialisation has to take place. More specifically,
every pair of TTPs, whose users wish to communicate securely, have to do the following.
• Agree on public values g and p, where g is a primitive element modulo p and p is
a large integer.
• Agree on the use of a digital signature algorithm, choose their own signature
key/verification key pair, and exchange verification keys in a reliable way. Any
user B wishing to receive a message from a user A, with associated TTP TA,
must be equipped with a trusted copy of TA’s verification key.
• Agree on a secret key K(TA,TB) and a Diffie-Hellman key generation function
f .
If A wishes to send a secure message to B, A and B have to be provided with certain
parameters by their respective TTPs.
• Using the function f , and the secret key K(TA,TB) and the name of B as input
to f , both TA and TB generate the private integer b satisfying 1 < b < p−1. This
key is known as B’s private receive key and it needs to be securely transferred from
TB to B. The corresponding public receive key for B is set equal to gb mod p.
The key b will be used to protect all traffic from clients of TA to B.
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• TA randomly generates a private send key for A, denoted a, and signs a copy of
A’s public send key (equal to ga mod p). A’s private send key and public send
key will constitute A’s send key pair, which A will use when sending confidential
messages to any users, not just those associated with TB.
• A must also be equipped with a copy of B’s public receive key. This can be
computed by TA and transferred in a reliable way to A.
The mechanism. The information the two entities possess prior to the use of the
mechanism, can be used to generate a shared key gab mod p (where a is A’s private
send key and gb is B’s public receive key) for protecting the confidentiality of a message
sent from A to B. This key can be used as the session key or, as the authors suggest,
it can be better used as a key encryption key, which in turn can be used for protecting
a suitable session key.
User A then sends the following information to user B.
• The message encrypted using the session key (either gab mod p or a key encrypted
using gab mod p),
• A’s public send key ga mod p signed by TA, and
• the public receive key gb mod p for user B.
Upon receipt of the message B, using A’s public send key ga mod p and B’s own
private receive key b, can generate the session key gab mod p and decrypt the received
encrypted message.
A representation of the scheme is given in Figure 2.3 (note that inter-TTP commu-
nication is not shown; CertTA(ga) denotes a copy of A’s public send key signed by
TA).
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Figure 2.3: JMW scheme
Warranted interception. Warranted interception of encrypted communications is
feasible as long as one of TA and TB operates within the intercepting authority’s
jurisdiction. The intercepting authority has the following options (assuming that A,
served by TA, sends encrypted data to B, served by TB).
• Request TA to recover the shared key gab mod p. In that case, TA has the
following options:
– Combine B’s private receive key b (generated fromK(TA,TB) and the name
of B using the key generating function f) with A’s public send key, sent with
the message.
– Combine A’s private send key a with B’s public receive key, sent with the
message.
• Request TB to recover the key. Because TB does not have access to A’s private
send key there is only one way that TB can recover the key, namely by combining
B’s private receive key b and A’s public send key, sent with the message.
Properties of the mechanism. The JMW scheme has the following properties.
• A user can arrange for his/her send key pair to be changed at any time by simply
requesting his/her TTP to generate a new key pair, which is then passed by the
TTP to the user.
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• No directories are required to make the system work. An entity wishing to send a
message only needs to obtain the public receive key for the intended recipient from
his/her own TTP, who can generate this information merely from the name of
the recipient and the identity of the recipient’s TTP. A recipient of an enciphered
message will, given the information contained in the message, possess all the data
necessary to obtain the session key, without further reference to any third parties.
• All receive key pairs can automatically be updated at regular intervals, by includ-
ing date information (e.g. month and year) within the scope of the key generating
function f .
2.5.2 Key encapsulation
We next describe three examples of key encapsulation schemes.
2.5.2.1 Commercial Key Recovery
Probably the most representative example of a key encapsulation mechanism is the one
proposed by Walker, Lipner, Ellison, and Balenson in [91], which the authors refer as
a “Commercial Key Recovery (CKR) System”. The main objective for the design of
this mechanism was to “respond to the objections to Clipper without sacrificing the
government’s law enforcement interests”.
The proposed scheme employs a data recovery centre (DRC), which is a KRA either
established by a corporation, for its own use, or by an external organisation which offers
this service. Every time a key recovery enabled program encrypts a file or message using
a session key, the corresponding key recovery information is generated. This is the data
recovery field (DRF), containing the session key and the user’s identity encrypted using
the DRC’s public key and the DRC’s identifier. “This information is stored with the
file or sent with the message, and these are the only places the session keys reside.
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There is no database of escrowed keys, at the DRC or elsewhere”.
If an authorised entity, e.g. a user or corporate management, is unable to decrypt a
message, it needs to send the DRF together with appropriate authentication informa-
tion to the corresponding DRC. The DRC, using its private key, will decrypt the DRF
and return the session key to the requester via a secure channel.
2.5.2.2 TIS Commercial Key Recovery
The TIS CKR scheme, also described in [91], is a key encapsulation mechanism with
enhanced features that allow authentication and authorisation of the entity requesting
recovery. In particular, “the DRF holds more than merely the encrypted file key”. It
includes the following unencrypted fields:
• a version number (for the DRF itself),
• a name for the DRC, and
• a number for the DRC’s public key (since each DRC can have multiple key pairs).
It also contains a field encrypted with the indicated DRC’s public key, containing:
• an access rule index (ARI), which tells the DRC how to challenge any requester
to make sure that he/she has permission to get access, and
• the file key (an individual encryption key for this encrypted data only).
The ARI is a number, chosen by the DRC, indicating an access rule (AR), which
“defines the process for verifying permission to gain emergency access”. ARs are defined
by the user during the initial registration phase, and each user can have any number
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of ARs, “to represent different sets of people or conditions for emergency access to
different data”.
The TIS CKR scheme uses four types of ARs.
1. A direct personal identification (such as a password, one-time password, or public
key signature verification), which can be checked directly between the person and
the DRC over a secure channel.
2. An indirect personal identification, in which a third party vouches for the identity
of the individual.
3. Testimony about a condition, e.g. testimony by a trusted individual or organi-
sation about an event, such as a death or transfer of funds that has cleared the
bank.
4. A group of ARIs. This is a threshold group of n previously defined ARIs, such
that k out of the n ARs in the group need to be satisfied in order to satisfy this
AR. The ARIs involved can be of any of the four types. The threshold group
allows specification of logical AND, OR and majority – as special cases.
The scheme has also an override capability that permits emergency access to data
owned by the corporation.
2.5.2.3 IBM Secure Key Recovery
Another example of a key encapsulation mechanism is IBM’s Secure Key Recovery
(SKR) [27]. SKR differs from other key encapsulation mechanisms in that the data
encryption key is not encrypted under the KRA’s public key but under a symmetric
key established between the user and the KRA(s). The proposed mechanism can be
used for encrypted communications as well as for encrypted archived data.
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For this scheme each user initially registers with two key recovery agents in his domain,
while each KRA has at least one private and public key pair.
The mechanism. The SKR mechanism consists of a two-phase process as shown
in Figure 2.4. The division of the mechanism into two phases allows the expensive
public key computations to be avoided in all but the first communication between the
communicating parties. More specifically, Phase 1, which must occur at least once
before one or more communication sessions take place, consists of the following steps.
1. The communicating parties A and B establish a common random seed S. This is
typically done using a key agreement protocol, e.g. Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
or an RSA key transport protocol.
2. A uses S to derive random key-generating keys (KG), specific to each recovery
agent, by hashing S and the respective agent’s ID.
3. A encrypts KG using the respective agents’ public keys.
4. A sends to B the SKR Block 1 (B1) which consists of: T1, ePUa1(KGa1),
ePUa2(KGa2), ePUb1(KGb1), and ePUb2(KGb2), where
• T1 is a public header containing IDs for A, B, and all key recovery agents,
• eP denotes public key encryption with key P ,
• PUai is the public key for A’s ith agent,
• PUbi is the public key for B’s ith agent,
• KGai is the key generating key for A’s ith agent, and
• KGbi is the key generating key for B’s ith agent
In Phase 2, the two parties establish the session keyK, which will be used for encrypting
any subsequent communications, using any key transport or key agreement protocol.
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Figure 2.4: SKR communication process
Phase 2 occurs prior to the start of encryption for each encrypted session and consists
of the following steps.
1. A and B establish session key K.
2. A derives for each agent a key generating value KH as the hash of the respective
KG value, and a key-generating header. The KH key-generating keys are used to
derive subordinate sets of pseudo-random key-encrypting keys KK (see [27, 35]
for a detailed description of key generation in SKR).
3. A derives for each agent a session-specific key KK as the hash of the respective
KH value, and the session’s public header T2.
4. A nested encrypts K under the sets of session-specific KK key encrypting keys.
5. A sends to B the SKR Block 2 (B2) which consists of the values: T2, h(B1),
EKKa1.1(EKKa2.1(K)), and EKKb1.1(EKKb2.1(K)), where
• T2 is a public header consisting of T1, the session ID, a timestamp e.t.c.,
• EK denotes symmetric key encryption using key K,
• h is a hash function,
• KKai.1 is the first key encrypting key for A’s ith agent, and
• KKbi.1 is the first key encrypting key for B’s ith agent.
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Key recovery phase. In the recovery phase, the authorised entity that requests the
recovery of a key has to pass to a set of agents the block B1 and the public header T2
from B2. The agents are not given the rest of T2, and in particular the doubly encrypted
key K, so that they will not be able to recover the key individually. The agents decrypt
their respective blocks and recover the KG values, which they use together with the
headers T1 and T2 to generate the values KK and KA for the session covered by the
T2 header. Each agent returns to the Recovery Service the calculated KK, as shown
in Figure 2.5, and the latter recovers the requested key by decrypting the encrypted
recovery field EKKa1.1(EKKa2.1(K)) or EKKb1.1(EKKb2.1(K)).
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Figure 2.5: SKR key recovery process
As the agent does not return the long term KG value but only key-encrypting keys KK,
the secrecy of the KG value is not compromised, and hence the requesting authority
cannot recover data from other sessions. However, if the user and agent agree, it is
possible to release the value KH to the requesting authority, which will give access to
a set of sessions instead.
2.6 Attacks on KRM functionality
In this section we describe two methods of attack on KRM functionality. The term
‘attack’ is used here to describe means of defeating the objective of key recovery, i.e.
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preventing the authorised recovery of keys to decrypt encrypted data.
2.6.1 Rogue user attacks
Rogue user attacks are amongst the most effective attacks against a KRM, and are
probably the most difficult to prevent. Such an attack typically involves a rogue user,
who wants to circumvent the KR system so that his encrypted data cannot be accessed
by an authorised third party even when the KR system is used [67]. The rogue user
bypasses or disables the key recovery functionality, either by passing the wrong key
material to the agent or by altering or deleting the key recovery information generated
by the mechanism. The way these attacks are mounted depends on the mechanism
and in some cases they can be successfully prevented. However, no KRM can prevent
dual rogue user attacks, where there is collusion by two or more dishonest users. In the
case of archived data, it is impossible to prevent a rogue user from deploying his own
cryptographic infrastructure [91], a situation that constitutes another form of rogue
user attack.
2.6.2 Superencryption
Superencryption, i.e. a technique where data is encrypted more than once, can be
considered as a special type of rogue user attack. In this case, the rogue user does not
attempt to bypass the key recovery functionality using any of the methods previously
mentioned, but he rather uses a non-escrow cryptosystem to pre-encrypt his data [4, 71].
Thus, the user makes proper use of the KRM but the agent recovers encrypted data
instead of plaintext. The user, however, who appropriately manages the keys of the
non-escrow cryptosystem, will have full access to the plaintext.
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2.7 Making KRMs robust
In this section, we describe some techniques that can be used as countermeasures to
the attacks on the KRM functionality identified in the previous section.
2.7.1 Integrity checks
An integrity check is a means whereby interested parties can ascertain that the key
recovery functionality is properly invoked and has not been maliciously modified by a
rogue user, i.e. the key recovery mechanism is not being circumvented.
In [4], a set of measures for achieving the integrity of software products are described,
including the following.
• Build integrity checks at several points into the product. These typically involve
the use of digest functions embedded in the product for verifying the integrity of
the product functionality by comparing the computed digest with the one given
by the software’s vendor.
• Have different integrity checks verify different areas of the product.
• Use several different instruction sequences to perform the integrity checking func-
tion. This will prevent an adversary from performing an automated scan to
identify and remove all integrity checks at once.
2.7.2 Implementation on trusted hardware
In order to achieve a higher degree of security, parts of the security functionality on
the user’s terminal could be implemented on a separate, trusted, tamperproof security
module or token, such as a smart card. Such an approach can help to prevent rogue
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user attacks by keeping the security functionality intact.
2.8 Weaknesses introduced by deployment of KRMs
Key recovery mechanisms, if they are not properly deployed, can introduce weaknesses
into the security infrastructure, which an adversary might exploit.
2.8.1 Attacks on the agent
Key recovery systems provide an alternative means of access to decryption keys, and
hence to the data encrypted with these keys. The concentration by some KRMs of
key material at a single location, especially in a key escrow system, make this location
a point of attack that an attacker might want to exploit [1]. Unless these keys are
appropriately protected and access control mechanisms are in place, the deployed KRM
will introduce a major vulnerability point in the security chain. Attacking single keys
that give the attacker access to a large number of the users’ keys also constitutes a major
threat. This is the case with key encapsulation mechanisms where a vast number of
users’ keys are encrypted under a single agent’s private key. If this key is compromised,
all the data encryption keys encrypted with it will be revealed to the attacker.
2.8.2 Untrusted agents
Although one of the crucial requirements for an entity that acts as a key recovery agent
is to be trusted, there is no guarantee that this will always be the case. There might
be situations where the agent might relax its security policies, go bankrupt, or get
corrupted. In situations like these, the secrecy of the users’ keys, and hence their data,
is critically endangered.
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2.9 Strengthening the security infrastructure
In this section, several countermeasures that can be used to enhance the security in-
frastructure are described.
2.9.1 Dispersion
Dispersion is the property where “joint (but not necessarily unanimous) participation
by multiple, designated entities is an essential step in key recovery” [83]. Such an
approach typically requires that the recovery of the target keys is done by an indepen-
dent authorised entity, such as a law enforcement agency or the management of the
corporation. Each agent administers part of the required key recovery information.
Participation of all, or k out of n agents in the case that a (k, n) threshold scheme
is used [59], is essential for the recovery of the keys. An example is provided by the
Escrowed Encryption Standard, where recovery of the requested keys is done by the
authorised entity and not by the agents, while participation of 2 out of 2 agents is
required for the recovery, i.e. EES is a (2, 2) threshold scheme.
2.9.2 Collusion-resistance
In some environments, an additional goal to dispersion might be to ensure that even
if the agents collude they will not be able to recover the required key material. This
feature allows the user or an authorised entity to control the recovery of keys. Collusion
resistance typically requires an authorised entity to retain critical information for the
recovery of keys [83].
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2.9.3 Residual work factor
A residual work factor requires the agent to possess only a portion of the information
required for the recovery of keys [80]. Keys can then be recovered through trial-and-
error techniques or cooperation with the entity that retains the rest of the required
information, including the user or the entity that is authorised to recover the keys. As
described in [83], “a residual work factor can be used to increase the overall work effort
involved in key recovery, to discourage ‘casual’ recovery requests and to keep part of
the overall security of key recovery in the hands of the user”.
2.9.4 Making the trusted parties oblivious
Micali in [60] describes a method of avoiding unauthorised actions by trusted parties
especially in the case of law enforcement access. In particular, Micali considers the
situation where “a trustee requested by a court order to surrender his share of a given
secret key may alert the owner of that key that his communications are going to be
monitored”. While, however, making trustees oblivious avoids this undesirable situa-
tion, several problems are introduced, the most important being the weakness of the
system to unauthorised key recovery requests. That is, if the trustees do not know
which user’s key material they are revealing, they cannot easily verify the legitimacy
of the request.
2.9.5 Using procedural means to protect the key recovery material
Almost any deployed cryptographic infrastructure (e.g. those containing Certification
Authorities or Key Distribution Centres) concentrates trust in a small number of
security-critical network entities. Compromise of such an entity will almost certainly
severely damage security throughout the network that this trusted entity serves. In
this respect, key escrow centres do not significantly worsen risks that are commonly
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dealt with in existing security infrastructures which do not possess a KR capability.
The threat posed by such concentrations of trust is typically dealt with by well-
established techniques, including physical and procedural security measures (combined
with rigorous auditing of the use of security facilities). In particular, such measures can
be used to enforce the principle of ‘dual control’ to critical security functions, whereby
no single individual is ever granted access to such functions or data.
2.10 Summary
In this chapter we introduced the concept of key recovery and we gave a general model
of a key recovery mechanism. We described several existing KRMs, covering both key
escrow and key encapsulation, the two main categories of key recovery mechanisms.
Attacks both on KRM functionality and on weaknesses introduced by their deployment
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This chapter addresses the business needs for key recovery as a countermeasure to the
threat of losing potentially valuable information. Requirements essential for a sound
key recovery mechanism are described, and the applicability of the two main classes of
key recovery schemes to a corporate environment is examined.
49
Matching key recovery mechanisms to business requirements
3.1 Protecting business information
Protection of information through the use of security mechanisms has become vital
for business. Cryptographic keys, including key agreement keys, session keys used for
encrypting communication sessions or stored data, and signature keys, are a crucial
part of the security infrastructure protecting corporate data. Loss or unavailability of
encryption keys will lead to an inability to access the encrypted information, a situation
the corporation will typically not wish to tolerate. Within a business environment there
are many cases where access to keys might be lost, arising from both deliberate actions
and accidents. The former might originate from both outsiders and insiders, while
accidents can be due to a failure of mechanisms.
As far as deliberate actions are concerned, it has been reported that more attacks to
corporations’ systems are likely to come from insiders rather than outsiders [15, 84].
This needs to be taken into account when establishing a cryptographic infrastructure
offering services such as data confidentiality. Employees acting as the only holders of
encryption keys might pose a threat to the corporation. Suppose a user’s employment
is terminated, and that the user is the only holder of keys used to encrypt business
information. On leaving the company, the employee might withhold these keys, either
deliberately or through simply forgetting to hand them to their legitimate owner. If
there is no backup of these keys, and there is no way to recover or recompute them,
then access to the information encrypted under them is infeasible (assuming that the
cryptographic mechanisms used are strong enough to prevent a cryptanalytic means of
decryption). Similar problems arise when an employee cannot be contacted because he
is absent, e.g. on vacation. It is easier and safer to be able to recover the encryption key
within the company’s protected environment rather than having to contact the user,
in some cases in insecure environments, bearing the risk of accidentally revealing the
keys to untrusted third parties.
As far as failure of, or damage to, devices is concerned, this is always a threat in the
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business environment. More specifically, if encryption keys are stored in a damaged
device, and there is no backup or other means to recover the keys, then data encrypted
under the inaccessible keys will be lost. This device could be a hard disk storing a file
of passwords used to derive keys, or a smart card containing a key or key component.
In the latter case, losing the token itself is also not unlikely.
In [15] it is mentioned that AccessData of Orem, Utah, a company that provides soft-
ware and services to companies that have lost access to encrypted data, “reported in
1995 that they received about a dozen and a half calls a day from companies with
inaccessible computer data. About a third of these calls resulted from disgruntled em-
ployees who left under extreme conditions and refused to cooperate in any transitional
stage by leaving necessary keys. Another half-dozen resulted from employees who died
or left on good terms but simply forgot to leave their keys. The remaining third resulted
from loss of keys from current employees.”
In addition to the possibility of key loss, companies may wish to monitor employ-
ees’ communications, either external or internal, e.g. to track leaks of information.
This is especially necessary in hierarchical environments where exchange of proprietary
information, even within the company’s domain, needs to be monitored. Corporate
monitoring of communications can also deter employees wishing to break security poli-
cies governing the flow of classified information [35]. Corporations may further wish to
have access to encrypted communications for non-repudiation purposes in the event of
a dispute, or even for running checks on incoming traffic, e.g. for viruses or for intrusion
detection.
Although key recovery can be used to deter employees, it can also be used to promote
the use of cryptography. Unless they are sure that the data they encrypt can be
recovered even if they lose the decryption keys, employees may be reluctant to use
encryption, hence leaving their data unencrypted even though that information needs
to be protected.
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3.2 Distinguishing between a business environment and
law enforcement access
The term key recovery, or more specifically key escrow, has attracted much unfavourable
publicity mainly because of a number of government proposals for compulsory escrow
of all private communications keys, see e.g. [92]. The intention of these proposals was
to give governments the ability to decrypt intercepted communications to deal with
criminal activities. However, this has been seen by a number of parties as a potential
infringement of the rights of individuals and corporations to provide privacy for data
stored and communicated electronically.
In a business environment, however, the situation is rather different [1]. Corporations
cannot tolerate loss of potentially important information through the unavailability of
encryption keys. Further, and most importantly, a company normally owns its infor-
mation, and therefore the issues surrounding access to private communications through
compulsory key escrow do not arise. KRMs deployed in a corporate environment can
be thought of as part of routine disaster recovery planning.
Moreover, the requirements for KRMs used for law enforcement access and those de-
ployed in a business environment are slightly different, making this distinction impor-
tant. As described in [1], the requirements for a KRM designed for law enforcement
access include the following.
1. Access without end-user knowledge or consent. While law enforcement
typically requires the monitoring of users’ communications without the latter
being aware, recovery of keys in a business environment does not necessarily have
this requirement. The company, as the owner of the encrypted data, has the right
to recover keys should an emergency situation arise, with or without the user’s
knowledge or consent.
2. Ubiquitous adoption. Governments have been seeking the ubiquitous adoption
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of “key recovery for all encryption, regardless of whether there is benefit to the
end-user” [1]. In a business environment, however, deployment of a KRM will be
in a restricted controlled environment where users can benefit from the existence
of KRMs, as these can help prevent loss of access to their data.
3. Fast access to plaintext. Law enforcement access to encrypted communica-
tions demands service availability round-the-clock, and seeks the ability to obtain
decryption keys quickly (in some cases within one or two hours). This is to help
monitor fast-moving criminal or terrorist activities. Within a corporation, how-
ever, time restrictions are not expected to be such an important requirement
when the KRM is used for archived data and the corporation can typically toler-
ate longer response times.
Granularity of keys is another strong requirement for KRMs deployed for law enforce-
ment needs as it limits LEA access to those communications authorised by a valid
warrant [45]. In a business environment, however, granularity is of minor importance
as the corporation will typically have the right to access any corporate data.
A discussion of the need to distinguish between business and law enforcement require-
ments can also be found in [65]. Note, however, that in [65] the authors claim that
enforceability, i.e. a requirement that the users cannot circumvent the KRM, is not
strongly required in a business environment. We believe that this is not always true
as enforceability (or non-circumventability, as it is identified in this thesis) is necessary
for the prevention of rogue user attacks. The existence of a controlled environment, i.e.
an organisation’s infrastructure, does not necessary mean that the users cannot ma-
nipulate the generated key recovery information (in some KRMs), thus circumventing
the key recovery functionality.
In the following section the requirements on a KRM deployed specifically in a business
environment are described in detail.
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3.3 Requirements for KRMs deployed in a business envi-
ronment
Although key recovery mechanisms address problems arising from loss of decryption
keys, they should always be deployed with extreme care. If the mechanism is not prop-
erly deployed it can seriously weaken security, as KR provides an alternative means of
access to encryption keys that may be easier for an attacker to exploit than the orig-
inal computation process. Thus, the fundamental security requirement for any KRM
is that the effort to exploit and break the cryptographic infrastructure with KR added
should not be less than the effort required if the cryptographic infrastructure lacks
KR functionality. Moreover, the KRM deployed should not weaken the cryptographic
mechanisms used. In particular, it should not necessitate the use of specific mechanisms
and algorithms which may be weak.
Another obvious requirement is that honest users and agents should be able to suc-
cessfully use the KRM, and, if possible, the deployed mechanism should be transparent
to users and acceptable by users and agents. Moreover, the mechanism should not be
vulnerable to rogue user attacks.
The following list gives requirements for a KRM deployed in a business environment.
It is not unlikely, however, that most of the these requirements also apply in a LEA
environment. For instance, some of these (in particular requirements R2, R3, R4, and
R5) are identified in [45] where the authors consider them as a general framework
for analysis of key recovery systems regardless of the environment that they are used.
Detailed requirements regarding a general functional model of a key recovery system
are also proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in [66].
R1. Non-circumventability: The KRM should be infeasible to circumvent, i.e. users
must not be able to use the cryptographic mechanisms while bypassing the KR
information generation process. Further, the user should not be able to generate
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invalid KR information or alter/delete it after its generation. It should be noted
that a lot of mechanisms do not meet this requirement, making them vulnerable
to rogue user attacks.
R2. User completeness: Honest users should succeed in making use of the KRM to pro-
duce valid KR information. This requirement covers any need for the availability
of a server that will be involved in the KR information generation process, or of
any public key material required by the KRM during this process. User complete-
ness should also satisfy the users need for being able to use the KRM to recover
their keys without the agent’s intervention. This is particularly relevant to the use
of a KRM for archived data, and is discussed in detail in Sections 3.5 and 4.1.
R3. Agent completeness: An authorised entity complying with the company’s rules and
policy should succeed in recovering the required keys. Any authorised attempts to
recover keys, successful or not, should be logged for audit purposes.
R4. User soundness: As a result of the first requirement, any attempt to misuse the
protocol by a dishonest user should be prevented, or at least be detectable. More
specifically, a rogue user should not succeed in establishing a secure communication
or encrypting stored data while producing invalid KR information without being
detected and logged for audit purposes.
R5. Agent soundness: Any attempt by an agent to misuse the protocol or recover
keys without complying with the company’s policy should at least be detectable.
Within this category of misuses fall both attempts by unauthorised entities and
unauthorised attempts by authorised entities. Agent soundness can be achieved by
the use of well-established access control mechanisms. Any unauthorised attempt
to use the recovery process, successful or not, must be logged for audit purposes.
R6. User acceptability: The protocol should be acceptable to users. However, in a cor-
porate environment this property is less important, since the use of the mechanism
will typically be specified within the corporate security policy, and hence part of
the conditions of employment. Nevertheless, factors that will help acceptability
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include: making clear the benefits of its use, its flexibility, availability, compati-
bility and interoperability with existing schemes, and, probably most importantly,
its efficiency of use (see property 11 below).
R7. Agent acceptability: The protocol should be acceptable to entities authorised to
recover keys. The main factor that will lead to acceptability is the protocol’s
efficiency, i.e. it should be easy for agents to recover keys efficiently and quickly
by using the protocol in accordance with the corporate security policy.
R8. Policy compliance: The protocol should operate within the corporate security
policy, and should satisfy all relevant legal restrictions. Within the latter fall any
constraints imposed by laws within the domain the corporation operates, such as
those covering cryptographic algorithm use and export.
R9. Flexibility: The KR scheme should not prohibit the use of well-known and secure
cryptographic mechanisms. This is closely related to the main security require-
ment that the KRM should not weaken or introduce any vulnerabilities to the
cryptographic infrastructure by imposing restrictions on the mechanisms used.
R10. Interoperability: The mechanism should be capable of dealing with dissimilar
KRMs, or cryptographic mechanisms that do not have KR functionality. This
is particularly important for communications enhanced with a KR capability. A
thorough analysis of the interoperability problem and its proposed solution is given
in Chapters 6 and 7.
R11. Mechanism transparency: The KRM should be transparent to end users in that
it should not introduce any significant computational overhead, or demand user
interaction when the user employs the cryptographic mechanisms.
R12. Negligible cost: Deployment of the KRM should introduce only a negligible increase
in the overall cost of the cryptographic services used and the security infrastruc-
ture. In particular, the cost of using the mechanism should not exceed the value
of the information encrypted using an inaccessible key.
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Although, as previously mentioned, some of these requirements are also identified as
requirements for a LEA environment, others are of no relevance to a KRM deployed
for LEA access. One example of such a requirement is interoperability of key re-
covery mechanisms. This is because law enforcement access typically seeks the wide
(even global) deployment of a KRM which is potentially not expected to interact with
other schemes. However, the variety of existing KRMs and their deployment in vari-
ous business environments is expected to cause interoperability problems in encrypted
communications.
Other requirements differ from those for LEA access in the degree that they should
be met. For instance, while user acceptability has proven to be one of the crucial
requirements for the deployment of a KRM for LEA needs, it is not expected that
it will be an important factor in a business environment, assuming that the benefits
from the use of a KRM will be made clear to the users. Cost is another issue that
corporations are likely to consider, in contrast to governments which can typically
tolerate higher expenses.
The above list of requirements can also serve as criteria for evaluating a KRM. All of
them are likely to be essential for a sound mechanism, but factors that can influence
their criticality should also be taken into account. For example, a slight weakening of
the user and agent acceptability requirements is allowable if all the other requirements
are satisfied and there is no alternative. The target of a KRM, that is whether it is used
for communicated or archived encrypted data, can also affect the above requirements.
A more detailed analysis of this distinction is given in Chapters 4 and 6.
There are other issues involved in using KRMs. KRMs require the existence of an
infrastructure supporting key management techniques meeting the requirements of the
mechanism. Clearly the administration and cost of the required infrastructure are fac-
tors that cannot be ignored. Moreover, if the mechanism is not appropriately deployed
a number of security issues might arise. Storage of any KR information should be
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carefully protected to prevent unauthorised access. If appropriate access control re-
strictions on the recovery process are not enforced, an adversary without the required
privileges might be able to recover keys and monitor communications or decrypt stored
encrypted files. More important still, if the infrastructure lacks the existence of an
audit log mechanism where all attempts to recover keys are monitored and reviewed,
then the system could be significantly more vulnerable to compromise than it would
be if it lacked KR functionality.
These requirements may be more difficult to meet if the corporation decides not to
perform key recovery internally but rather to outsource the service. While there are
certain risks associated with outsourcing the service (the agent might relax its security
policies, go bankrupt, or even be bought out by a competitor while retaining the ability
to recover keys [1]) this solution might be more attractive to small and medium-sized
enterprises that are not willing to deploy their own infrastructure.
3.4 Assessment of existing mechanisms
In the following sections, the applicability of existing KRMs to a business environment
is investigated. More specifically, the two main types of KRMs are considered, i.e. key
escrow and key encapsulation, taking into account only their general characteristics as
described in Section 2.4.
3.4.1 Assessment of key escrow mechanisms
When key escrow mechanisms are used in a business environment, there is typically a
need for a large storage capacity for the escrowed information and, more importantly,
this information must be protected from unauthorised access. The latter is one of
the main drawbacks of key escrow mechanisms, as pointed out frequently by their
opponents. As mentioned in [1], the storage of all keying material at a single point
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makes it a significant point of attack, and introduces a major vulnerability to the
key escrow mechanism if appropriate countermeasures are not in place. The main
protection mechanism that can be employed for this purpose is strong access control,
ensuring that only authorised personnel can access the escrowed key material and
recover user keys. Access control should be enforced in conjunction with appropriate
audit log mechanisms that will enable the monitoring of all attempts to access the
escrowed keys and make use of the recovery process. Dispersion of the key material to
multiple locations, resistance to agents’ collusion, and residual work factor (see Section
2.9) can be used as additional countermeasures. If all these protection mechanisms are
in place, supported by an appropriate security policy, the likelihood of misuse of the
KRM can be minimised.
Key escrow mechanisms are likely to be integrated into a cryptographic infrastructure,
i.e. the KR functionality will be closely related to the key establishment process. For
these mechanisms to work properly and not to face interoperability problems (require-
ment R10; see Section 6 for more details), there is a need for a common infrastructure
meeting the mechanism’s requirements. In other words, such mechanisms usually de-
mand the existence of specific key establishment protocols, a requirement that can
cause interoperability problems in communications sessions, making them difficult to
deploy world-wide. As a consequence, if they are deployed by a corporation they may
constitute a barrier to encrypted internet communications with other organisations.
Even if the KR information can be generated solely at the user’s end, with no require-
ment for interaction with the peer, the dependence on the cryptographic infrastructure
would require the communicating parties to use cryptographic mechanisms compatible
with the KRM.
Such mechanisms are, however, potentially more appropriate for intranet communica-
tions, where it is easy to establish a common infrastructure, and also for archived data
encryption. If the KRM is part of the cryptographic infrastructure, and dependent
upon it, circumventing it will typically require the rogue user to circumvent the whole
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cryptographic functionality, and hence not use the provided mechanisms. In controlled
environments, such as a corporation, it is not infeasible to restrict the user’s resources,
and hence requirements R1, R3, and R8 can be efficiently met. This is not the case for
key encapsulation mechanisms as will be described later, or even for those key escrow
mechanisms that are less dependent on specific key establishment protocols.
When assessing key escrow mechanisms it is useful to make a further distinction be-
tween those that at least sometimes require the on-line participation of a TTP acting as
an escrow agent and which assists in the session key establishment process (such as the
JMW scheme [39]), and those that do not. In the first category fall mechanisms such as
the ones where the escrow agent acts as a key distribution centre (KDC) or key trans-
lation centre (KTC), and in the meantime escrows all the keys that the users establish.
For this class of key escrow mechanisms, an on-line server, which must typically be
able to deal with a large number of simultaneous requests, will be involved in all, or
at least a significant number of, the key establishment processes. The agent’s on-line
participation makes these mechanisms the most difficult to circumvent, and rogue user
attacks are difficult to mount. Furthermore, they give the agents more control over the
KR information than with other mechanisms, a scenario that fits the business model
(assuming that agents are internal to, and managed by, the organisation). These prop-
erties are particularly relevant to requirements R1, R3, and R7, which this type of key
escrow mechanism can efficiently satisfy. Compromise of this server, however, would
have unpredictable consequences. An adversary in control of the server functionality
would typically be able to recover all the established keys and decrypt communicated
or archived data. Moreover, agent unavailability would mean that users are unable to
encrypt data, hence requirement R2 will not always be satisfied. Thus, protection of the
server against unauthorised use and denial of service attacks becomes a fundamental
issue.
In the second category fall mechanisms that are less dependent on an on-line escrow
agent. For these mechanisms, the user escrows certain key-related information, typi-
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cally during the initialisation phase, which enables the agent to recover session keys
subsequently generated by the user. As an example, consider a scheme where the sender
encrypts the session key under the recipient’s public key, while the corresponding pri-
vate key is escrowed with the user’s agent. Although there is no need for the agent
to be on-line for these mechanisms, avoiding any availability requirements, they are
no more flexible than mechanisms of the first category, since they also typically need
an infrastructure to assist in all the cryptographic computations. For instance, in the
given example users need to possess each others’ valid certificates. This means that a
complete certificate management scheme is required, including an inter-organisational
public-key infrastructure (PKI) (e.g. a certificate repository, and means to generate
and manage certificate revocation lists).
Cost (requirement R12) is another important consideration, especially in a commercial
environment. Although deployment costs might be acceptable, long term administra-
tive costs cannot be ignored. Key escrow mechanisms require provisions to protect
the escrowed key material, and in that respect are potentially expensive. Although the
cost might be significantly reduced if an external agent is used, as previously mentioned
there are clear potential disadvantages of such an approach.
Summarising the above, key escrow mechanisms can efficiently satisfy non-circumventability
(R1), especially in cases where the key recovery agent controls the key establishment
process. As a result agent completeness (R3) and policy compliance (R8) will also be
satisfied. Problems, however, might arise if an on-line agent is used for the key es-
tablishment process, whose unavailability can affect user completeness (R2) and user
acceptability (R6). Finally, key escrow mechanisms are likely to suffer from interoper-
ability problems, and hence not satisfy requirement R10, and their cost (R12) cannot
be considered negligible.
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3.4.2 Assessment of key encapsulation mechanisms
When used in a corporate environment, the majority of key encapsulation mechanisms
appear to be more flexible than key escrow schemes. Being independent of the key
establishment technique means that protocols can easily be adapted to them and,
unlike key escrow schemes, they are unlikely to suffer from key management related
interoperability problems and hence, they can satisfy requirement R10. The data
encryption keys will typically be encrypted under KRM-specified public key(s), with no
restrictions on their nature or generation (requirement R9). Interoperability, however,
can be affected in communication sessions by the interaction the mechanism might
require with the remote party prior to generation and/or for verification of the KR
information. This might include mechanism-specific public keys that the originating
party needs to generate the KR information, or any verification checks the peer is
required to perform on the received KR information prior to decryption.
Unlike some key escrow mechanisms, a key encapsulation infrastructure would typically
not require a high powered on-line server, as there is no need for on-line interaction dur-
ing the KR information generation process (of course, such a server may be necessitated
by other key management requirements). Therefore, user acceptability (requirement
R6), as far as the availability of the KRM is concerned, will always be satisfied. De-
ployment of such a mechanism in a corporate environment, however, might necessitate
checks on transmitted KR information to ensure users comply with the company’s pol-
icy (requirements R3, R4, and R8). This is because key encapsulation mechanisms
are vulnerable to cut-and-paste attacks, where a rogue user can alter or delete the KR
information after its generation to disable subsequent key recovery by an authorised
entity. To prevent this, and hence satisfy requirements R1, R3 and R7, authorised
entities could run checks on the generated KR information to ensure that the KRM
has been properly used (assuming that such checks are supported by the KRM); such
checks could be made at random, or only if rogue activity is suspected.
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One way of preventing rogue user attacks is to check intercepted KR information. If the
intercepted information is invalid, the transmitted data could be prevented from leaving
the organisation’s domain. Rogue user attacks can also be prevented by requiring the
validation of the KR information by the receiving party prior to decryption of the
received data. This latter solution, however, requires trust in the receiving entity,
which is not always the case, especially if the latter is not within the company’s domain.
Thus, a drawback of key encapsulation mechanisms is that, in order to ensure that the
mechanism is not circumvented, there is a potential need for on-line checks on the
generated KR information. This checking can prevent both single rogue user attacks
that are not prevented by the mechanism itself, and double rogue user attacks where
the colluding entities agree to make use of the organisation’s cryptographic mechanisms
but bypass the key recovery process by tampering with the key recovery information.
On-line checks on the key recovery fields might be trivial if the key recovery agent
operates within the company’s domain. In that case a server that resides behind
the organisation’s firewall can be used for this purpose. However, verification of the
KRF might be harder if the agent is external to the organisation. Only checks can
be performed in this case, and then only if the information is intercepted during its
transmission, or if all communications are routed through an agent’s server. This is
because the data may already have left the company’s control and have reached their
destination. Thus, in this case, detection of rogue users remains possible, but the
capability for prevention is much more limited. Of course, it may be the case that
detection is sufficient, for actions can be taken against rogue users as soon as a single
instance of system misuse is detected. However, in situations where misuse must always
be prevented, it will probably be appropriate to have an internal rather than an external
agent.
Note that existing key recovery mechanisms typically do not support third party val-
idation of KR information, a property that can help meet requirements R1, R3, R4,
and R8. A model designed for this purpose was proposed in [89] but, as described in
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[71], the proposed scheme suffers from superencryption attacks. Simple techniques can
be employed, e.g. demanding the encryption of a data field known to the agent with
the key used for encrypting the rest of the data. Decrypting this field with the key
contained in the KRF would give the agent an indication as to the validity of the KRF.
Even with these techniques, however, mechanisms can still be vulnerable to rogue user
attacks. Probably the most effective solution is to decrypt the data, and search for
expected patterns that should, or should not (in the case of malicious software), be
present in the transmitted data.
Key encapsulation mechanisms are even more vulnerable to cut-and-paste attacks when
the mechanism is used on encrypted archived data. It would typically be too costly to
check the validity, either on-line or off-line, of every KRF produced for every encrypted
file. Therefore, a rogue user could tamper with the KRF by simply deleting or modi-
fying the field after its generation, thereby disabling any authorised KR attempt. This
will typically constitute a breach of policy (requirement R8), and action could be taken
against that employee, who might even lose his job. However, from the company’s
perspective the data are lost, and hence the KRM has failed. In such a case, it would
be more appropriate to use a key escrow mechanism which will give the company the
ability to have more control over the generated keys.
Another relevant issue is that, in key encapsulation mechanisms, the management of
the keys is left with the user. In hierarchical environments this property might cause
problems if different agent public keys are used to protect KRFs for different levels of
classification of information. The user will have to decide which key he should use for
encrypting the key recovery information, depending on the sensitivity of the data. This
might lead to confusion, and even accidental or deliberate misuse of the KRM. This is
not always the case with key escrow mechanisms, where the escrow agent can manage
the generated data encryption keys.
Key encapsulation mechanisms are not inherently more secure than key escrow mecha-
64
3.5 Distinguishing between communicated and archived data
nisms. Although for the latter there is a need to protect all the escrowed key material,
and unauthorised access to it would typically give the attacker access to data encryp-
tion keys, the compromise of the agent’s private decryption key in a key encapsulation
mechanism would have the same unacceptable consequences.
Finally, key encapsulation mechanisms appear to have potentially lower management
costs than key escrow schemes (requirement R12). For such a mechanism there only
needs to be a cryptographic infrastructure. There is no need for on-line participation
of the agent, which potentially requires a high powered server (unless the corporation
demands on-line checks on generated KRFs), or for the secure storage of all the escrowed
keys. However, these cost estimates might be altered, depending on the mechanism’s
implementation. For instance, if it is decided to deploy user smart cards, then the cost
of issuing a card for each employee may not be negligible.
Summarising the above, key encapsulation mechanisms are more susceptible to rogue
user attacks than key escrow schemes, and thus they do not always satisfy the non-
circumventability requirement (R1). Susceptibility to rogue user attacks is likely to
have the same effect on agent completeness (R3), agent acceptability (R7), and policy
compliance (R8). However, as key encapsulation mechanisms can typically work with
any key establishment protocol and key encryption algorithm, they are quite flexible
(R9), and they cause less interoperability (R10) problems than key escrow mechanisms.
Finally, their cost of deployment (R12), although it cannot be considered negligible, is
likely to be less than key escrow mechanisms.
3.5 Distinguishing between communicated and archived
data
The above analysis of KRMs in a business environment has not considered the target
data. There are certain issues, however, that need to be addressed as far as the target
of the KRM is concerned. This arises from the fact that there are different requirements
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for KRMs for archived data and KRMs for communicated data.
The majority of existing key recovery mechanisms were designed for use with commu-
nicated data, and with the objective of giving access to LEAs. Giving user access was
typically not a design requirement mainly because users would not benefit from such
a property. As mentioned in [1], “there is hardly ever a reason for an encryption user
to want to recover the key used to protect a communication session”. If the session
key is lost during an encrypted session, a new session can be established and a new
key can be negotiated. This, however, does not rule out business demands for access
to encrypted communications.
With communicated data, interoperability of the deployed KRMs is the most important
requirement. Otherwise, use of dissimilar mechanisms might prohibit the establishment
of a secure communication session. Interoperability is an issue that is covered in detail
in Chapters 6 and 7.
With archived data, the requirements are rather different, making the distinction es-
sential. With archived data, the focus of the design of the KRM should also consider
the users’ needs for recovery of data. In other words, apart from fulfilling third parties’
needs, the KRM should also be the users’ means for access to lost keys. It would be
a waste of communications resources and processing power if the user had to contact
his agent whenever he wants access to his encrypted data or requests recovery of a lost
key. Moreover, interoperability is no longer an issue, as encryption of archived data
will typically only involve one entity, and hence only one KRM. As a result of this,
however, the mechanism will be more susceptible to rogue user attacks where the user
might deliberately delete or alter the generated KR information.
Electronic mail is a special case because it has the characteristics of both communicated
and archived data. If the decryption key for an encrypted e-mail is lost, access to the
email will be infeasible unless the sender re-sends the message. The ability to recover
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keys used for encrypting e-mail could be of a potential benefit to the user.
Therefore, the differences that necessitate the distinction between KRMs used for com-
municated data and those used for archived data are as follows.
• Interoperability. While interoperability is a critical requirement for KRMs used
for encrypted communicated data it is of no importance to KRMs for archived
data.
• Susceptibility to rogue user attacks. In encrypted communications, attacks
where a rogue user tampers with the generated KR information can be prevented
by requiring the receiving party to verify it prior to decryption (although this
might not always be an efficient countermeasure against these attacks). This
is not possible with archived data, however, as during a typical encryption of
archived data there will be only one entity involved.
• Users’ ability to recover their keys unaided. While users typically do not
benefit from being able to recover keys used for their encrypted communications,
the situation is rather different for archived data.
The next two parts of this thesis consider these two types of KRMs in more detail.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, the possible dangers to a corporation arising from an inability to access
keys used for encrypting data have been considered. An analysis has been made of the
requirements for KRMs applied in a business environment, and the applicability of
existing mechanisms was investigated. More specifically, the deployment of the two
main types of KRMs, i.e. key escrow and key encapsulation, has been assessed on the
basis of their general properties. As there is no panacea to the key recovery problem,
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careful analysis of the business needs is necessary to identify appropriate solutions.
A further distinction was made between requirements for KRMs for communicated
data and for archived data. This distinction has motivated the work described in the
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In this chapter we identify the requirements for a key recovery mechanism used specif-
ically for archived data, and we propose two schemes where keys used for stored data
encryption can easily be recovered.
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4.1 Requirements for KRMs for archived data
Keys used for encrypting stored data should be saved so that later decryption will be
feasible. Storing these keys unencrypted makes them subject to unauthorised access.
If, however, they are protected by a private key (e.g. password) a question arises as
to where this key is stored. Requiring the user to memorise it is very risky (it is not
unlikely that the user will forget it), while, if it is stored on a secure device such as a
smart card, then there is a risk that the device will fail, or will be lost or destroyed.
Archived data management typically involves only one entity, which stores and retrieves
data at distinct points in time [59]. Keys used by this entity to encrypt stored company
data are likely to be possessed only by this entity. Therefore, decryption of archived
data by a third party (a crucial requirement in a business environment) will be infeasible
unless a KRM is in place that will enable recovery of the data decryption keys.
Previously proposed KRMs were mainly designed to provide KR functionality for en-
crypted communications. As we discussed in Chapter 3, when these mechanisms are
applied to archived data (especially key encapsulation schemes [83, 91]), they suffer
from the absence of a second party that can verify the generated KR information. As
a result, they become particularly vulnerable to rogue user attacks, where a rogue user
can tamper with (alter or delete) the KR information during or after its generation,
making it invalid to third parties. While this kind of attack on some KRMs, such as key
encapsulation schemes, is typically prevented in a data communication environment by
requiring the receiving party to verify the KR information prior to decryption of the
received data, this is infeasible for stored data encryption.
Another problem with most existing KRMs is that they do not offer the user the ability
to recover his keys unaided, hence forcing him to contact his agent, who will recover
the keys on the user’s behalf. This problem arises from the fact that the intention
of the majority of the proposed mechanisms was to give LEAs access to encrypted
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communicated data. Designs have therefore typically focused on giving access to keys
to the on-line agent rather than the user himself, i.e. the user is given no means to
recover his data encryption keys unaided. As a result, applying these mechanisms
to encrypted archived data introduces extra communications costs from the necessary
interaction with the agent. User key recovery will also necessitate the existence of an
on-line agent.
For example, consider a key encapsulation mechanism where the KRF contains the
data encryption key encrypted under the agent’s public key. Whenever the user wants
to access an encrypted file, and assuming that a copy of the key is not kept locally, he
has to ask the agent to recover the decryption key from the KRF. Problems will then
arise when the user works off-line, or if there is no connection with the agent because of
a network failure; the user will be unable to use the KRM to recover his keys because
of the agent’s unavailability. A solution to this problem is for the user to have a backup
of the keys stored locally, and whenever he requires decryption of a file the copy of the
key is used instead of the KRM. This solution, however, introduces new risks.
A key recovery mechanism that would be specifically designed for use with encrypted
archived data while overcoming the aforementioned problems should typically satisfy
the following requirements. Note that this is not a complete list of requirements; it
rather highlights those requirements that are of particular relevance to the use of a
KRM for archived data, and which are not satisfied by the majority of the existing
mechanisms.
1. The KRA should have the ability to recover the required keys, even when the
user tampers with the generated KR information. This is particularly relevant
to key encapsulation mechanisms where the KRA typically does not have direct
control over the key generation process.
2. The mechanism should give the user the ability to recover his keys unaided, i.e.
without the KRA’s intervention. This will ensure that the user has continuous
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access to his keys while avoiding the need to keep a backup of them locally (an
approach that introduces new threats to the secrecy of the keys).
Further to these requirements, it will be an advantage if the KRM makes no demands
for an on-line agent or for storage of users’ key related material.
4.2 Applicability of existing mechanisms
To examine the applicability of existing KRMs, we start by making the same distinction
as in Section 3.4.1, that is, between key escrow mechanisms that require the existence
of an on-line TTP and those that do not.
1. Mechanisms requiring on-line participation of the escrow agent for key generation
appear to be more secure from the non-circumventability point of view. As they
are typically integrated within the cryptographic mechanisms, circumventing the
KRM would require the user to avoid making use of the cryptographic mecha-
nisms, and hence make no use of encryption. One example of such a mechanism
is provided by a KDC that generates keys on the users’ behalf while a copy of
the key is kept by the agent. Yet, as already mentioned, these mechanisms suffer
from the requirement for a high-powered server that will participate in the key
generation process.
2. KRMs that are less dependent on on-line agent participation are weaker as far as
circumventability is concerned. Within this class, however, fall some mechanisms
that do not have this problem. For example, consider a KRM where a user escrows
a Master Key with his agent. He subsequently uses the Master Key, combined
with some additional data that the agent is assumed to know in advance, to
compute the session key. Such a scheme does not require the existence of an
on-line TTP. Yet, the TTP has direct access to the generated key, and this is
the characteristic distinguishing it from other mechanisms of the same category.
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Both these types of mechanisms suffer from the problems previously mentioned regard-
ing key escrow mechanisms. That is, deployment of such a scheme would require the
existence of large storage devices for the administration of the escrowed keys, which
require the use of strong security mechanisms for their protection.
Key encapsulation mechanisms used for encrypted archived data have the advantage
that neither an on-line agent nor storage of any KR material by the user’s agent is
required. Although key encapsulation mechanisms increase the amount of data that
have to be stored, as the encrypted key has to be attached to the encrypted data,
we assume that this is not a problem in most applications. Moreover, the session
key is adequately protected as it is encrypted, together with some mechanism-specific
credentials, under the public key of the user’s agent. Key encapsulation mechanisms,
however, are vulnerable to cut-and-paste attacks where a rogue user alters or deletes
the generated KR information, preventing access to the encrypted data by authorised
entities. So, as far as circumventability is concerned, these mechanisms appear to be
more vulnerable than key escrow.
A KRM designed for use with archived data, as well as with encrypted messages and
session keys, was proposed by Maher, [53]. The Maher Crypto backup system pro-
vides corporations access to keys that are lost, destroyed, or withheld from legitimate
access, by automatically making “a backup key through a controlled process”. The
system requires agents and users to share a value x and a function f with the following
properties.
• The function is easy to compute, but its inverse in r is computationally infeasible.
More specifically, r is hard to compute from the value f(x, r) when the value x
is known.
• For any two values r1 and r2, f(f(x, r1), r2) = f(f(x, r2), r1).
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One example of a suitable choice for f is obtained by putting f(x, r) = xr mod p,
where p is a large prime and x is chosen to be an element of large prime multiplicative
order modulo p.
The Crypto Backup process is implemented by the following steps.
1. The value x and the function f are fixed.
2. The agent, namely Trusted Backup Agent, generates a random value rM , which is
the agent’s private MasterKey, and computes the corresponding public MasterKey
as y = f(x, rM ).
3. The public MasterKey together with the agent’s identity is signed by an appropri-
ate authority, thus binding the agent’s identity to the agent’s public MasterKey.
4. A user U of the backup system, generates a random number rU and constructs
the key k to be used for the file or message encryption as k = projn(f(y, rU )),
where projn selects the first n bits of its argument.
5. User U generates the Backup Recovery Vector (BRV), which is a vector that con-
tains information identifying the agent and information sufficient to recover the
corresponding key k for a single file or message, as (idA, idy, f(x, rU )). Follow-
ing its generation, either the BRV is placed in the file header or an appropriate
pointer to a BRV file is provided to the agent.
Although the described mechanism does not require the agent’s participation in session
key generation, it suffers from the problem that a user can tamper with the generated
key recovery information and prevent key recovery. It might be argued though, that
if the key recovery process is automatic and transparent to the user, then rogue user
attacks are relatively unlikely. However, in many circumstances users will nevertheless
be aware that key recovery is taking place, and hence might wish to take steps to
prevent key recovery operating correctly. Therefore, a rogue user can typically alter or
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delete the attached BRV, or submit an invalid BRV to the BRV file, hence disabling
key recovery by the agent. Moreover, the user cannot recover the keys used without
the agent’s participation, a property that makes the mechanism less attractive for use
with archived data.
Two different schemes are proposed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 that effectively overcome
these problems, with the first being an adaptation of Maher’s scheme. The two mech-
anisms have the following common properties.
• Users do not require their agent’s intervention to recover keys previously used.
• The mechanisms are not vulnerable to rogue user attacks on the generated KR
information.
• The mechanisms make no demands for the user to escrow with the agent any key
related material.
Therefore, the proposed mechanisms avoid both the key encapsulation mechanisms vul-
nerability to rogue user attacks, and the key escrow mechanisms’ demands for storage
and protection of users’ key related material. The main difference between the two
schemes is that the second KRM requires user communication with the agent(s) during
key generation, and mandates the use of smart cards. Use of smart cards in the first
mechanism is optional, although, as discussed below, their deployment can help prevent
rogue user attacks.
Both schemes are ‘text expanding’, i.e. the encrypted string will be longer than the
cleartext string. Whilst this will not be a problem in most applications, there exist cer-
tain special circumstances, for example the encryption of individual database records,
where this is a serious problem. Dealing with such special cases is outside the scope of
this thesis.
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, for rogue user attacks we assume that a rogue user, trying
to disable authorised KR by his associated KRA, may tamper with the generated
KR information by either altering or deleting it, or may even prevent its generation.
However, we assume that the user will leave the encrypted data unchanged so that he
can recover it when necessary (if the encrypted data is modified or destroyed, then no
KRM can deal with the situation). For instance, the rogue user might simply detach
the KR information from the encrypted file, and retain the KR information separately
so that it is not available to the KRA. Through possession of this information the user
can recover the required key but the KRA cannot.
4.3 A new KR scheme
4.3.1 Specification of scheme
Whenever a user wants to encrypt a file or message, instead of generating a random
key and using it to encrypt the stored data, he uses the proposed mechanism which
will also allow later recovery of the generated key. For this mechanism the following
requirements must be satisfied:
1. All entities share public values p and g, where p is a large prime number and g
is an element of large prime multiplicative order modulo p. We will write gx for
(gx mod p) throughout.
2. Each user and each KRA has a Diffie-Hellman [20] key agreement key pair. More
specifically, user A has private key agreement key x with corresponding public
key gx, and KRA C has private key agreement key y with corresponding public
key gy. The user’s key pair can be generated by either the user or a certification
authority (CA) specified in the corporation’s policy (or even by both of them
[62]), and the public key is certified by the latter. If the CA and KRA are not
the same entity, the KRA can also get its public key agreement key certified by
77
Applying key recovery to archived data
a CA in the hierarchy.
3. The entities share a one-way hash function h.
4. A repository for distributing the certified public keys has to be in place.
The KR information generation phase consists of the following steps:
1. When a user wants to encrypt archived data, a KRA is selected depending on
the demands of the data to be encrypted (note that this can be an automated
process), and obtains the KRA’s public key certificate from the repository.
2. The user generates session key K as:
K = h((gy)x mod p ‖ “data credentials”)
where ‖ denotes concatenation, x is the user’s private key and gy is the KRA’s
public key agreement key. The “data credentials” can vary according to the
application of the KRM. If the data is a file, the “data credentials” can be derived
from the file’s unique characteristics, e.g. the date of the file’s last modification,
and/or the name of the file. If the data is a message, a unique serial number that
identifies the message is sufficient. The generated key, or part of it, depending on
the requirements of the encryption mechanism, can be used for the encryption of
the message or file.
3. A key recovery field (KRF) is generated and attached to the encrypted data
(message or file). The KRF consists of the identity, idKRA, of the agent whose
public key agreement key gy was used to compute the session key, a serial number
idy that identifies the agent’s public key if the agent has multiple public keys,
and the “data credentials” used to compute K. That is, the KRF is:
KRF = (idKRA, idy, “data credentials”)
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When a user wants to decrypt the data, he simply recomputes the key K by executing
step 2 from the KR information generation phase. That is, during the user key recovery
phase:
1. The user detaches the KRF from the encrypted data.
2. Using the agent’s identity idKRA and the key serial number idy, both contained in
the KRF , the user obtains from the repository the certificate for the appropriate
agent public key (if he has not already got a valid copy stored locally).
3. Using his private key agreement x, the KRA’s public key agreement key and
the “data credentials” field, contained in the KRF , the user can re-compute the
required key.
If an authorised entity wants to recover a key, he detaches the KRF and sends it to
the KRA identified by the idKRA field, along with the appropriate authorised request.
The requesting entity must also inform the KRA who the file owner is, i.e. the user
that encrypted the file, so that the KRA can retrieve the appropriate user’s public
key certificate. The latter task can be left to the requesting entity which, in this case,
must pass the certificate to the KRA. If the recovery request complies with the relevant
security policy the agent proceeds with the agent key recovery phase:
1. The agent extracts from the received KRF the “data credentials” and the value
idy, which will identify the agent’s key used. Moreover, the agent retrieves the
user’s public key agreement key if this is not received from the requesting entity.
2. The agent is now in possession of all the key material required for the recovery
of the requested key, which the agent can easily compute.
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4.3.2 Properties and security analysis
From the above description it should be clear that, during the user key recovery phase
there is no need for interaction with the agent, a property that simplifies the key
recovery process for the user. More specifically, when a user wants to recover a key
that he has previously used to encrypt archived data, the agent need not participate
in the key recovery process. The user is able to recover the keys himself, without the
KRA’s intervention.
The majority of KRMs lack such a feature; the user’s KRA is typically the only entity
that can recover the key. With the proposed scheme the user will be required to contact
his agent only if he has lost his private key agreement key, in which case the only entity
that can recover the user’s keys is the KRA. This property typically eliminates the
requirement for an on-line agent and avoids the related communications overhead.
Further properties of the proposed mechanism include:
1. The agent and the user are the only entities that can access the data encryption
keys. Encryption of a file by a user that is not its owner, if this is allowed by
the access control system, will give ownership of the encrypted file to that user.
This will ensure that when the agent attempts to recover the corresponding key,
it will use the appropriate user public key. If the operating system cannot assign
ownership of the encrypted file or message, the user’s identity can be included in
the KRF as an alternative. Moreover, if a user can have multiple keys, the KRF
should also contain an identifier for the one used.
2. There is no need for the agent to store any user-specific key material. The only
storage requirement is that there must exist a repository from where the cer-
tificates, for both users’ and agents’ public key agreement keys, can be easily
obtained. Each agent, however, has to ensure that its private key agreement
key(s) are protected against disclosure to unauthorised third parties.
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3. The “data credentials” field used in the key generation process ensures the unique-
ness of the generated key for each file or message encrypted, assuming these data
are unique. Thus, each key recovery request by an authorised entity will be
restricted to a single file or message.
4. Although with the proposed scheme the encrypted data will be longer than the
cleartext this is not a problem in most applications. Those special cases where
’text-expansion’ might be a problem are outside the scope of this thesis.
5. The corporation’s environment can be divided up and multiple agents’ key agree-
ment keys can be used, each one corresponding to a single domain, group of users,
or level of information classification. The management can thus ensure that a sin-
gle agent’s key agreement key can only be used to recover specific types of data
encryption keys.
6. The proposed scheme is not restricted to encryption of archived data. It can
also be used in encrypted communications, given the existence of an independent
means for conveying the generated key to the receiving party. In that case,
however, the peer will not be able to verify the validity of the generated KR
information, although this may not be a problem since the mechanism is not
vulnerable to rogue user attacks.
7. Unlike many KRMs applied to encrypted archived data, the proposed scheme
is not vulnerable to rogue user attacks. If a rogue user tampers with the KR
information, aiming to disable any authorised KR attempt by the agent, the
proposed scheme offers an alternative means for the agent to recover the keys.
Specifically, if only a limited number of bytes are used as the “data credentials” for
the key computation, the agent can mount an exhaustive key search, as described
in Section 4.3.3, which will recover the required key in a reasonable time period.
The following remarks can also be made concerning the security of the proposed mech-
anism.
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1. A rogue user who wants to disable key recovery on his encrypted files has to sub-
vert the whole key establishment process. Appropriate software integrity checks
[4] can ensure the proper use of the cryptographic infrastructure.
2. To avoid an attack where a rogue user generates his own Diffie-Hellman key pair
and uses it to generate a session key, an on-line check can be run on the validity
of the certificate for the public key agreement key used. That is, if necessary, the
mechanism can pass the public key agreement key being used to the agent over
a secure channel. The agent can thereby check its validity in a user-transparent
way. This on-line check can be avoided, however, if the key is stored in a smart
card, as described in Section 5.3, assuming the user is not able to create ‘bogus’,
apparently legitimate, smart cards.
3. Use of smart cards can also prevent a rogue user from manipulating the key
after its generation, e.g. the user can use the generated key as input to a keyed
function while using the output of this function as the session key. To prevent
such an attack the whole mechanism should be implemented on the card, i.e.
encryption must take place on the card, although there are certain limitations
associated with such an approach, as described in Chapter 5. An alternative is
also proposed in the next chapter.
As with the mechanism proposed by Maher [53] this scheme can also be modified to
reduce the trust that needs to be placed in one agent. Each user can use keys from
multiple agents, thus eliminating any unauthorised attempt by a single agent to recover
encryption keys. More specifically, assume, for simplicity, that the user wants to split
his trust between two agents and that these two agents have private key agreement keys
y1 and y2 and corresponding public key agreement keys gy1 and gy2 respectively. When
generating an encryption key, instead of simply using one agent’s public key agreement
key, both agents’ public keys are used:
K = h(gx(y1+y2) mod p ‖ “data credentials”)
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During the key recovery phase, the user can reconstruct the key following exactly the
same procedure as before. An agent that wants to recover a requested key must obtain
the user’s public key agreement key raised to the power of the other agent’s private key
agreement key. Thus both agents must participate in key recovery.
4.3.3 Defeating rogue user attacks
The agent, as previously mentioned, can mount an exhaustive key search for the re-
quested key if the user tampers with the KR information. Performing a known-plaintext
exhaustive key search would typically require the knowledge of at least as many bits of
plaintext as there are bits in the unknown “data credentials” used to derive the secret
key. Therefore, we propose prefixing the data to be encrypted with a fixed bit string,
known to the KRA, of sufficient length to enable the correct key to be determined.
Note that, in normal use, the encryption software will delete this fixed string during
decryption. By this means, if there are 2k possibilities for the “data credentials”, then
finding the correct key is expected to take approximately 2k−1 trials.
Given the above requirements, it should be clear that, for current technology the “data
credentials” field should not exceed 6 bytes in length, i.e. k = 48, if a result is required
within a short time period (not more than a couple of days) and at reasonable cost.
Nevertheless, if the bytes making up the “data credentials” are highly redundant, e.g.
if each byte is an ASCII-coded alphanumeric character, then using a larger number
of bytes for these credentials will become possible. Ultimately, the size of the “data
credentials” will depend on the resources and the time that a corporation is willing
to spend on an exhaustive search for the keys. This, in turn, will depend on the
availability of key searching technology – note that, for example, in [93] it is estimated
that a $10,000 machine can find a 56 -bit DES key in 2.5 days.
If the rogue user also attempts to delete the encrypted fixed string from the encrypted
data, then a ciphertext-only key search can be attempted. As described in [59], “if the
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underlying plaintext is known to contain redundancy, then ciphertext-only key search
is possible with a relatively small number of ciphertexts”. In that case the criteria for
a correct key would be characteristics that are expected to be found in the decrypted
text, e.g. the coding of the expected plaintext.
Further suppose that a rogue entity, in an attempt to circumvent the key recovery
process, uses the cryptographic infrastructure to perform superencryption, at the same
time deleting the key recovery information at each stage. If the encrypted fixed strings
used to prefix the data to be encrypted are left in place, then a series of brute force
searches, each of expected size 2k−1, will be sufficient to recover the plaintext, even if
different “data credentials” are used for each iteration of the superencryption process.
It could be argued that rogue users who do superencryption are smart enough to
circumvent the whole key recovery process by other means. However, performing su-
perencryption may only require a mouse click, and hence will be very easy to perform
for even the most non-technical of users. Taking other measures to defeat key recov-
ery (e.g. implementing another encryption algorithm) will not be an option for such
non-technical users.
Finally, if a rogue user performed superencryption while also deleting the encrypted
fixed strings, then recovery of the encrypted data may become infeasible, as it will now
probably be necessary to perform a simultaneous brute force search over the entire set
of keys used for superencryption. However, this seems a relatively minor threat, since
the amount of work involved for the rogue user may be more than simply introducing
a different cryptographic infrastructure.
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4.4 A second new KR scheme
4.4.1 Specification of scheme
We now describe another mechanism for adding KR functionality to the encryption
process for archived data. This mechanism requires the user’s interaction with the
agent during key generation, and it is this interaction that helps prevent rogue user
attacks.
Three entities are involved in the proposed mechanism: the user who encrypts the
data, the KRA which assists in the management of keys, and the authorised entity AE
which is the entity authorised by the corporate policy to have access to users’ data.
Whenever a user wants to encrypt a file or message, instead of generating a random
key for data encryption, he uses the proposed mechanism for key generation, which will
also allow later recovery of the generated key. For this mechanism, which necessitates
the use of a smart card by each user, the following requirements must be satisfied:
1. The KRA and the user’s card share a message authentication code (MAC) func-
tion f1, a one-way hash function h, and a key generating function f2 (this could
potentially be based on a one-way hash function). f2 is used to generate the key
KAC that will be used by the MAC function f1, i.e. KAC = f2(KM , idA), where
KM is the KRA’s master key and idA is user A’s identity. KAC should be stored
on the user’s card, typically during card personalisation. The user must not have
access to KAC , otherwise rogue user attacks become possible.
2. The KRA, user, and authorised entity share a key generating function f3. As
with f2, f3 can be based on a one-way hash function.
3. The user’s card and the AE share a secret key KAM which is generated as a
function of KA and a secret master key KAE that the authorised entity possesses,
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i.e. KAM = f3(KAE ,KA). KA is a master key specific to user A, which is
generated as a function of KRA’s key KM and the user’s identity idA, i.e. KA =
f3(KM , idA). As with KAC , KAM should also be stored on the user’s card during
the card personalisation.
4. The user has access to a random number generator. The generated random
numbers are used to ensure key freshness so that a file will never be encrypted
with the same key more than once.
5. The KRA administers a file consisting of indexes binding a unique file identifier
with a random value generated for the specific file. The integrity of this file must
be preserved.
6. All the entities trust the device where the encryption takes place, i.e. the user’s
PC or a server. If this is not the case then encryption has to take place on
the card, although there are certain performance limitations associated with this
approach (see Chapter 5).
When user A wants to encrypt a file, a session key KS has to be generated using the
following protocol.
1. A generates a random value RAND either on his card or on the PC. Using his
card, A computes a MAC on RAND and the unique identifier fileid of the file
to be encrypted, i.e. MAC1 = f1KAC (RAND,fileid). A then sends the following
message to the KRA,
A
idA ‖ RAND ‖ fileid ‖ MAC1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ KRA
where ‖ denotes concatenation.
2. Upon receipt of the message, the KRA uses the received user’s identity idA and
the master key KM to compute the key KAC . The KRA then recomputes the
message authentication code MAC1 using the received values RAND and fileid
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and checks the result against the received MAC1. If the check succeeds the KRA
adds an entry to the index file consisting of the received fileid and the random
value RAND, indexed by the user who sent it. The KRA then computes a message
authentication code MAC2 on A’s identity idA and the values fileid and RAND,
i.e. MAC2 = f1KAC (idA,fileid,RAND), and sends it back to the user’s card.
A
MAC2←−−−−−−−− KRA
This tells the card that the KRA, which is the only entity that can compute
MAC2, has successfully registered the received random value RAND for the file
identified by fileid.
3. As soon as the card receives MAC2 it recomputes it using the values RAND and
fileid that it sent to the KRA, and checks it against the received MAC2. If the
check succeeds, the card uses the secret key KAM and the random value RAND
to generate the session key KS as
KS = f3(KAM ,RAND)
which is passed to the PC for the encryption process. The file is encrypted using
KS and a key recovery field KRF is attached to it. The KRF consists of the
random value RAND (the KRA’s identity should also be included if there are
multiple KRAs), i.e.
KRF = {RAND}
Should an emergency access situation arise, the authorised entity will request the ap-
propriate key KA from the KRA. Having KA and using the master key KAE and the
function f3, the authorised entity computes the corresponding user’s key KAM , i.e.
KAM = f3(KAE ,KA). Using KAM and the value RAND attached to the file, the
authorised entity can successfully recover the required key and the target data.
87
Applying key recovery to archived data
4.4.2 Properties and security analysis
With the proposed scheme, there is no need for interaction with the agent in everyday
user access to the encrypted data, a property that simplifies the key recovery process
for the user. More specifically, the user is able to recover the keys using his smart card,
which can recompute the target key KS using the value RAND attached to the file.
The user will be required to contact his agent only if he has lost his card, in which case
only the authorised entity AE can recover the user’s keys. This property typically elim-
inates the requirement for an on-line agent for the recovery of keys (for the purposes of
everyday user access to encrypted data) and avoids the related communications over-
head. Moreover, the user does not have to back-up or archive the generated keys, thus
avoiding the security hazards associated with secret key storage. Further properties of
the proposed mechanism include:
1. The proposed mechanism is not vulnerable to rogue user attacks, as even if a
rogue user deletes the generated KRF the KRA has the means to recover the
requested key. Using just the index file and the identity of the file and the user,
the KRA has all the needed values to compute the required key.
2. The KRA does not have to store or protect any of the user generated keys, thus
avoiding certain problems that key escrow mechanisms face, e.g. preventing unau-
thorised access to the escrowed material. The only requirement, apart from the
protection of the secret valueKM , is protection of the index file from unauthorised
modification.
3. The mechanism benefits from the separation of the KRA from the authorised
entity AE in that the KRA does not have access to users’ generated session keys.
The only entities that can recover the session keys are the users and the authorised
entity AE. This allows the corporation to outsource the management of the KRM
without endangering the confidentiality of the corporate data.
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4. Dispersion of key material, a countermeasure that makes attacks on key recovery
mechanisms more difficult, is properly enforced with the use of both KM and
KAE for the computation of KAM and, therefore, the generation of KS . Even if
KM or KAE is compromised an adversary cannot gain access to the users’ keys.
The attacker has to know both KM and KAE to be able to recover users’ keys.
5. The random value RAND can be generated either on the card or on the user’s
PC and passed to the card. The security of the mechanism, however, does not
rely on the randomness of this value, since it is only used to ensure freshness of
the generated key. As a result, RAND can be generated on the PC to reduce the
number of power consuming procedures that take place on the card.
6. As with the previous mechanism, to prevent a rogue user from manipulating the
key after its generation, the whole mechanism should be implemented on the card,
i.e. encryption must take place on the card. However, there are certain limitations
associated with such an approach and alternative countermeasures are described
in Chapter 5.
4.5 Comparison of the two schemes
As previously mentioned, the two schemes meet the two main requirements identified in
Section 4.1 for key recovery mechanisms specifically deployed for archived data. Their
main difference is the way that rogue user attacks are prevented. The first mechanism
solves this problem by imposing a residual work factor on the agent recovering the keys
when a rogue user attack occurs, a property that is likely to affect data availability
given the time needed by the agent to recover the required keys. The second scheme
requires the agent’s participation in the generation of the session keys. Therefore, agent
availability becomes a crucial requirement for the second mechanism, as otherwise it
forces the user to leave his data unencrypted.
Although the first scheme does not necessitate the use of smart cards, as the second one
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does, smart cards provide an effective means to prevent rogue user attacks. Therefore,
in terms of cost of deployment of the mechanism the second scheme is no more expensive
than the first one. Besides that, both mechanisms can be deployed using an existing
multi-application smart card, which the employee might already use, and hence they
may well not add significant costs to the existing infrastructure.
Both mechanisms offer the corporation the ability to outsource the service without
endangering the privacy of the encrypted data. Although this constitutes one of the
properties of the second mechanism, for the first mechanism use of multiple agents, with
one of them being internal to the corporation, is essential if the corporation wishes to
control the recovery process.
Finally, note that the second mechanism appears to be more secure against attacks tar-
geting the compromise of the agent’s key. The second mechanism requires an adversary
to know two keys, i.e. the KRA’s and the authorised entity’s master keys, to get access
to users’ generated keys, while compromise of either of those keys does not endanger
the privacy of the encryption keys. With the first mechanism, however, and if multiple
agents are not used, compromise of the agent’s private key would give the adversary
access to all the users’ generated keys (assuming that the adversary has access to the
users’ public keys).
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, the use of key recovery mechanisms for archived data has been investi-
gated. More specifically, we identified the requirements that a KRM should fulfil when
deployed to provide key recovery functionality for encrypted archived data. As most
of the existing KRMs were designed for use with encrypted communicated data, using
them with archived data causes problems, and thus there is a need for a mechanism
designed specifically for archived data.
90
4.6 Summary
Two different KRMs were proposed that satisfy the identified requirements. The first
involves a certain amount of work by the KRA to recover the keys if a rogue user deletes
the generated KR information. The second mechanism defeats rogue user attacks by
employing a secure user token and an on-line agent during key generation. Both mech-
anisms offer the user the ability to recover his keys without agent intervention. Neither
requires the direct escrow of any user generated keys, avoiding the costs associated
with the requirement for protection and administration of these keys.
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A prototype implementation of the first of the two proposed KRMs for archived data is
described in this chapter. The purpose of this demonstration is to examine the efficiency
of the deployment of this mechanism using smart cards, and more specifically, using
the Java Card technology.
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5.1 Introduction to smart cards
A smart card or integrated circuit card (ICC) is a small device, about the size of a credit
card, that contains memory, an input/output facility and, optionally, a microproces-
sor. Smart cards are capable of manipulating information, and hence they provide an
attractive platform for implementing cryptographic functions. Tamper-resistance is an-
other characteristic of ICCs which makes them a suitable medium for storing sensitive
information. As a result, use of a smart card can be an important part of a secu-
rity infrastructure, especially for operations that take place in untrusted environments.
Smart cards are used extensively for a variety of applications including banking, mobile
communications, and electronic purses.
Smart card applications consist of an ICC-aware application, or client, interacting
with a card-resident component. The ICC-aware application is the software program
that makes use of the functionality provided by the card, and which runs on some
computing platform known as the terminal. A terminal can be a personal computer
(PC), an automatic-teller machine, a personal digital assistant, or a network computer.
The card-resident component comprises data and functions that reside on the smart
card. The ICC communicates with the computing platform through the interface device
(IFD), also known as card acceptance device (CAD) or simply a smart card reader.
The ICC-aware application interacts with the smart card by exchanging pairs of pack-
ets called application protocol data units (APDUs). The communication model is
command-response based; the application sends a CommandAPDU to the smart card
by handing it to the IFD’s driver, which in turn forwards the APDU to the card.
The smart card processes the CommandAPDU and returns the response in a Re-
sponseAPDU. The set of Command–Response APDUs determines the smart card’s
functionality. Smart cards are reactive communicators, i.e. they never initiate commu-
nications.
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A command APDU, as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [36], consists of
• a mandatory header of 4 bytes (CLA, INS, P1, P2), and
• a conditional body of variable length.
Header Body
CLA INS P1 P2 [Lc] [Data] [Le]
Table 5.1 shows the contents of the command APDU (length is in bytes).
Table 5.1: Command APDU contents
Code Name Length Description
CLA Class 1 Class of instruction
INS Instruction 1 Instruction code
P1 Parameter 1 1 Instruction parameter 1
P2 Parameter 2 1 Instruction parameter 2
Lc field Length 1 or 3 Number of bytes present in the
data field of the command
Data field Data Lc String of bytes sent in the
data field of the command
Le field Length 1 or 3 Maximum number of bytes expected in the
data field of the response to the command
A response APDU consists of
• a conditional body of variable length, and
• a mandatory trailer of 2 bytes (SW1 SW2).
Body Trailer
Data field SW1 SW2
Table 5.2 shows the contents of the response APDU (length is in bytes).
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Table 5.2: Response APDU contents
Code Name Length Description
Data field Data Variable String of bytes received in the
data field of the response.
Its length depends on the Le value.
SW1 Status byte 1 1 Command processing status
SW2 Status byte 2 1 Command processing qualifier
5.2 Java Card
Among the various technologies that have been invented and used for smart cards, [30],
is the Java Card [85], which is a smart card that can execute Java Card applications,
namely Java Card applets or just applets. Java Card is a set of specifications issued by
Sun Microsystems and based on the Java programming language. More specifically, as
mentioned in [86], “Java Card technology combines a portion of the Java programming
language with a runtime environment optimized for smart cards and related, small-
memory embedded devices”.
The software components that comprise the Java Card are depicted in Figure 5.1.
A p p l e t A p p l e t A p p l e t
  J C R E
F r a m e w o r k A P I
J a v a  C a r d  V M Nat ive  me thods
Indus t ry  spec i f ic  ex tens ions
Figure 5.1: Java Card architecture
The heart of a Java Card is the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) [86], which
is the component that specifies how a Java Card manages its resources. More specifi-
cally, it defines how atomicity is to be achieved, how communication is to be handled,
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how applications are to be managed (including how objects are to be shared between
applets), and how security measures should be enforced. The JCRE includes native
methods, that perform the input/output and memory allocation services of the card,
and the framework, which is the set of classes that implement the Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API). The API defines the calling conventions by which an applet
accesses the JCRE and native methods.
A fundamental component of the JCRE is the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
[87] which consists of two components; one that runs on-card and the other that runs
off-card, i.e. on a PC or a workstation. The on-card JCVM executes bytecodes using
the bytecode interpreter, manages classes and objects, enforces separation between ap-
plications (firewalls), and enables secure data sharing. The off-card JCVM contains a
Java Card Converter tool, which converts the input class files into a Java Card exe-
cutable code format (CAP file) during the development process. It also provides many
of the verifications, preparations, optimizations, and resolutions that the Java virtual
machine performs at class loading time. A schematic representation of this process and
the relationship between the off-card and the on-card JCVM are depicted in Figure
5.2. This figure also briefly depicts the procedure followed for the preparation and
download of an applet to the smart card.
C o n v e r t e r J C R E
O f f - c a r d  V M O n - c a r d  V M
J a v a  C a r d  V M
.class
f i les
. c a p
fi le
Figure 5.2: Java Card VM and converted classes downloading
Java Card technology offers many benefits including platform independence, multi-
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application capability, and post-issuance of applications (i.e. loading applications onto
a card after issue of the card). Platform independence ensures that Java applets will
run on different vendors’ cards (compliant with the Java Card technology). Multi-
application capability allows multiple applications to run on a card and to be down-
loaded dynamically, while the inherent protection mechanism provides a secure en-
vironment for running multiple applications on a single card. Finally, post-issuance
of applications provides card issuers with the ability to respond dynamically to their
customers’ needs.
There are certain limitations, however, associated with Java Cards compliant with
the version 2.1 specification [85], including lack of support for dynamic class loading,
multiple threads and multidimensional arrays, and non-mandatory garbage collection.
These limitations, driven by the limited existing resources, in many cases make applet
implementation a challenging process.
The Java Card technology has been used to implement the mechanism proposed in
Section 4.3 to examine the efficiency of a smart card based version of the mechanism.
5.3 Implementation architecture
Implementation of the mechanism employing a user smart card, as mentioned in Section
4.3.2, offers benefits by securing the infrastructure against users’ attempts to deploy
their own, uncertified, key agreement keys, and to manipulate the generated session
key. The high-level architecture of a prototype implementation, using a PC as the
terminal, is depicted in Figure 5.3.
The Java Card applet contains all the functions accessible by the ICC-aware applica-
tion, and provides an interface to the library functions that implement the KRM. User
authentication is also part of the library functionality in the form of a secret 4-digit per-
sonal identification number (PIN). Once the user has been authenticated he can make
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Figure 5.3: The implementation architecture
use of the functionality provided by the applet, unless the card has been removed from
the IFD or a new session has started, in which case the user has to be authenticated
again.
The proposed KRM was implemented using the Giesecke&Devrient Sm@rtCafe´ Java
Card, partly compliant with the Java Card 2.1 API [85], while the interface technology
used was the OpenCard Framework (OCF), developed by the OpenCard Consortium.
5.3.1 OCF overview
OCF is ICC middleware that sits between an ICC-aware application and the smart
card reader. It is implemented in the Java programming language and seeks to provide
functionality required by ICCs, IFDs, and PCs to allow portability and interoperability
among compliant elements as provided by a variety of vendors.
The core architecture of the OpenCard Framework consists of two main components:
the CardTerminal layer and the CardService layer. The CardTerminal layer provides
access to physical card terminals and inserted smart cards. It also offers a mechanism to
insert and remove card terminals through the use of the CardTerminalRegistry, which
keeps track of the installed card readers [69]. The CardService layer represents a set of
smart card services, each of which defines a particular API that can be used to access
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a particular smart card function.
5.3.2 Applet functionality
The main applet functionality is provided by three library functions: verifycertificate(),
generatekey(), and encryptdecrypt(). The verifycertificate() function verifies
the certificate for the agent’s public key. For this purpose a valid copy of the CA’s
public key has to be preloaded on the card. The generatekey() generates the session
key K using the “data credentials” provided by the client, the user’s private key stored
on the card, and the agent’s public key. The user’s private key is accessible only by
this applet, ensuring that the key cannot be accessed by a malicious applet.
The coding of the commands sent to the card is as follows (the command for PIN
verification is not described). All the commands conform to the ISO/IEC 7816-4 format
[36].
• EncryptFile. This command is used to request encryption of the data included
in the “file data” field. The key will be generated using the data included in
the optional “data credentials” field. If the command executes successfully the
returned result is the encrypted data concatenated with the hex value ‘90 00’.
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc DATA Le
B0 50 GKCP 00 l Data Credentials File Data 00
GKCP – Generate Key Control Parameter. It can take the following values.
‘01’: The generatekey() function is invoked. The “data credentials” field
is required.
‘00’: Encrypt with the existing key. There is no “data credentials” field.
This mode is used when the data to be encrypted does not fit within the
data field of a single APDU, and hence multiple APDUs have to be used.
l – the length of the DATA field.
99
Implementation issues of the proposed KRM for archived data
• DecryptFile. This command is used to request decryption of the data included
in the “file data”. It has the same format as the ‘EncryptFile’ command except
for the ‘INS’ field which, in this case, has the hex value of ‘60’. If the command
executes successfully the returned result is the decrypted data concatenated with
the hex value ‘90 00’.
• GetCertificate. This command is used to pass to the card the certificate for
the agent’s public key agreement key. The certificate received by the card will be
verified and if this check succeeds the certified key will be used for the computation
of K and the returned result will be the hex value ‘90 00’. The coding of the
command is as follows:
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc DATA Le
B0 1A 00 00 l Certificate
The client part of the mechanism consists of three functions: encryptfile(), decryptfile()
and selectcertificate(). The selectcertificate() selects an agent’s public key
and passes the appropriate certificate to the card. The result of the encrypt() func-
tion is the encrypted file concatenated with the KRF. The decryption is performed by
extracting the KRF appended to the encrypted file, selecting the appropriate certifi-
cate, sending it to the card using the ‘GetCertificate’ command, and passing the “data
credentials” to the card with the ‘DecryptFile’ command.
5.4 Implementation details
For the experimental implementation, dummy values were used for the user’s private
key x and the agent’s public key gy, and hence for the resulting key gxy, as the desired
cryptographic functionality was not available on the card. Moreover, the agent’s public
key was preloaded on the card. As a result, the key generation function included only
the creation of a buffer which keeps the necessary key material, i.e. gxy and “data
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credentials”. This buffer is used as input to a digest function and the result is passed to
another function which converts the key to the format used by the encryption function.
The PKI functionality, including certificate upload and verification, was not part of
the demonstration. Instead, the implementation focused on an examination of the
encryption/decryption functionality efficiency and the handling of the generated key
within the card. Figure 5.4 gives a flowchart of the mechanism’s implementation.
The DES algorithm was used both in ECB and CBC modes for data encryption. The
reason for using two different modes was to make a performance comparison, and to
check how much more expensive the encryption process becomes when the CBC mode
is used. Note that the code listed in Annex A makes use of DES in ECB mode.
Although, as mentioned earlier, the Sm@rtCafe´ Java Card that we used was only partly
compliant with the Java Card 2.1 API, the lack of full compliance did not introduce any
significant implementation problems. It was not possible, however, for the developed
applet to be uploaded to a card fully compliant with the Java Card 2.1 specifications.
Major modifications would be required to the existing code to make it fully compliant
with the Java Card 2.1 API. Therefore, one of the main advantages of the Java Card
technology, i.e. portability provided by platform independence, is lost. This problem,
which arises from the fact that certain classes found in Sm@rtCafe´ Java Card are
not supported by other cards, is of course easily solved by making Giesecke&Devrient
Sm@rtCafe´ cards fully compliant with the corresponding specifications. As a result of
this problem, however, cross-checking of the performance measurements with imple-
mentations on other cards was not possible.
5.5 Performance measurements and analysis
The main conclusion from the implementation of the proposed mechanism is that bulk
data encryption on the card is still a prohibitively expensive operation. The perfor-
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Figure 5.4: Implementation flowchart
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5.5 Performance measurements and analysis
mance measurements indicate that encryption on a card is a very slow process even for
small amounts of data. Table 5.3 shows the results of ten consecutive encryptions of a
data block of 248 bytes, which is the maximum amount of data that can be sent within
a single APDU, given that the “data credentials” (6 bytes) used for key generation
are included in the same APDU. Three different procedures have been measured to
examine the efficiency of the implementation.
Table 5.3: Sm@rtCafe´ Java Card results using a block of 248 bytes of data
Mean time (ms) Std. Deviation
Encryption with key 2369 12.94
generation (DES-ECB)
Encryption without key 2133 12.195
generation (DES-ECB)
Encryption with key 2902 43.665
generation (DES-CBC)
Encryption without key 2657 40.838
generation (DES-CBC)
Transmission of 254 bytes 767 16.1
The “Encryption with key generation” figure indicates the time spent for the key gen-
eration together with the encryption of 248 bytes of data. Due to the lack of proper
cryptographic functionality on the card, as mentioned in the previous section, the key
generation stage includes only the computation of the digest of the key material and
its preparation for use by the encryption function.
The “Encryption without key generation” row of the table involves the same operations
as the previous figure except that no key generation takes place. The key used for
encryption is the key computed when the first APDU for the specified file has been
sent to the card. The difference between those two figures indicates that the actual key
preparation lasts roughly 230ms.
The “Transmission of 254 bytes” figure gives an indication as to the delay introduced
in the encryption/decryption process by the data transmission between the ICC-aware
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application and the card-resident component. This figure includes the delay introduced
by the use of OCF for the data transmission, and this gives an indication of OCF’s
performance as a middleware technology.
From the above figures, it is clear that with current smart card technology bulk data
encryption is a very expensive operation. A better approach would be to use the card
only for key management purposes, while data encryption can be done by the ICC-
aware application. The key can be passed to the ICC-aware application using secure
messaging, which is a method where cryptographic functions are used to protect and
authenticate the data passed to and from the card [36]. Use of secure messaging can
guarantee that the application that receives the key is the legitimate one and that this
key originates from a legitimate card and has not been modified during transmission.
Integrity checks on the ICC-aware application, [4], can also guarantee that the user will
not tamper with the software and that the key is not manipulated in an unacceptable
manner in an attempt to disable the key recovery functionality.
Alternatively, if the encryption is done by an ICC-aware application lacking integrity
checks, then random checks on the encrypted data can ensure that the key recovery
functionality is not bypassed by a rogue user.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we considered the use of smart cards to implement one of the two
key recovery mechanisms for archived data proposed in the previous chapter. The
efficiency of the implementation was examined using a Java Card, in conjunction with
the OpenCard Framework, which is an ICC middleware technology that sits between an
ICC-aware application and the card reader. The outcome of this test implementation
is that bulk data encryption on the card is still a very expensive procedure. With
current technology it appears more sensible to use the card for key management, while
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encryption takes place in the ICC-aware application.
The threats that arise from such an approach however, necessitate the introduction
of extra countermeasures for the protection of the key recovery functionality against
sophisticated rogue user attacks. Such countermeasures include secure messaging be-
tween the card and the ICC-aware application, and integrity checks on the ICC-aware
application.
As the technology advances, however, it is possible that bulk data encryption on a
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This chapter investigates the interoperability problems that arise from the use of dis-
similar key recovery mechanisms in encrypted communications. The components of a
key recovery mechanism that can cause interoperability problems are identified, as part
of the development of a general model for key recovery mechanisms
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6.1 Key recovery enabled communications
As previously mentioned, the issues surrounding key recovery for communicated data
are somewhat different from those for archived data. Typically, the keys used for tran-
sient communications need not be retained, as once the communication session has
finished such keys are no longer required and can be discarded. There is a need, how-
ever, for access to this key during its lifetime, i.e. during the communication session (or
afterwards if the company logs any communications), especially if this communication
takes place within certain environments, including companies and organisations. As
described in Chapter 3, the company might want to have access to encrypted com-
munications to check for malicious software or track leakage of sensitive information.
Therefore, there are certain situations where the use of a KRM is required. The require-
ments that are of particular relevance to a KRM specifically deployed for communicated
data are the following.
1. The KRM should give authorised entities the means to recover session keys used
to encrypt the exchanged data, as well as keys used to encrypt communications-
related data. This is vital for the company, as it may legitimately want to
keep track of certain outgoing communications, to use this information for non-
repudiation purposes in the case of a dispute, or even monitor incoming traffic
for malicious software or for intrusion detection purposes. Thus, individual keys
used by employees, or established during a communication session, must be re-
coverable. This includes keys generated by entities outside the company and used
to protect messages sent to the company.
2. The KRM should provide the ability for on-line and real-time decryption of the
intercepted communications. That is, if suspicious communications take place
between an employee and an outsider (or between two employees) then the man-
agement should be in position to monitor them. This includes the ability to verify
the validity of the KR information generated by the employee, or even decrypt
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the communicated data at the time they cross the company’s domain.
3. The KRM should be interoperable. That is, use of the mechanism should not
prohibit the establishment of a secure communication session.
Assuming that the first two requirements are universal for KRMs, our investigation
concentrates on the interoperability problems that are likely to arise from the use of
dissimilar KRMs in encrypted communications. This has also been one of the primary
concerns of the work carried out by the Key Recovery Alliance (see Section 1.1). Before
looking in depth in the interoperability problem, it is worth examining how the two
main categories of KRMs apply in encrypted communications.
6.2 Applicability of existing mechanisms
Most key escrow mechanisms designed for encrypted communications depend on a
common key management infrastructure. While this might not be a problem in a
corporate environment, i.e. for intranet communications, it is a major drawback when
using the mechanism for communications that span company domains. The main
reason is that there would be a need for the two communicating parties to deploy the
same, or at least compatible, key establishment protocols. Otherwise, the establishment
of secure communications is likely to be prevented.
Use of a key encapsulationmechanism, on the other hand, typically requires the addition
of data fields to the communicated data, to carry the KR information. A receiving party
in a different domain can simply modify its existing infrastructure so that additional
fields are discarded without being interpreted. This allows secure communication to
take place, and provides KR for the communicating party that wants it. However, such
a configuration allows rogue users to mount cut-and-paste attacks (see Section 3.4.2),
as the other party will not check the validity of the generated KR information.
109
Interoperability issues surrounding key recovery mechanisms
6.3 Interoperability
The word interoperability, as in [28], means the ability of entity A, which uses KRM
KRMA, to establish a KR-enabled cryptographic association with entity B, which uses
KRM KRMB. If A knows that B uses a different key recovery mechanism, then A
may not know whether B can meet the requirements of A’s KRM, and vice versa.
This uncertain situation may force the parties to avoid key recovery, with associated
increased risks especially when the entities operate in a business environment.
The interoperability issue arises from the variety of KRMs proposed by industry and
academia, in conjunction with the lack of a standard for KRMs. Note, however, that
even if KRMs were standardised there is no assurance that interoperability problems
would be eliminated. Standards tend to provide a variety of sound mechanisms but
not necessarily interoperable ones.
In the context of communications between two entities, A and B, we consider two possi-
ble scenarios where the use of a KRM might affect the establishment of a cryptographic
association.
1. Entities A and B make use of KRMs KRMA and KRMB respectively, which
might be identical, compatible or dissimilar mechanisms. In the case of identical
or compatible mechanisms the two entities are not expected to face any prob-
lems. Problems, however, might arise if the two entities make use of dissimilar
mechanisms. They are unlikely to be able to establish a secure communication
while making use of their respective KRMs as this would typically demand each





2. Entity A uses KRMA while B does not make use of KR. The issues that arise in
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this case are whether B will be able to meet KRMA’s requirements, and whether
A will be able to generate valid KR information. For the two entities to be able
to communicate, assuming that A manages to generate valid KR information,
B should at least be aware that A makes use of a KRM. This is important as
B should not discard incoming traffic because of unrecognised additional fields
(carrying the KR information and attached to the incoming data), which B can-
not interpret. Another problem that is likely to arise is whether A’s policy will
permit the acceptance of incoming traffic that does not make use of KR. If A
operates within a corporate environment, this requirement is likely to be crucial,
as the company might want to run checks for malicious software on incoming





Communicating entities who want KR functionality in their encrypted communication
sessions and who wish to avoid the above problems, must use interoperable KRMs.
Also, all deployed cryptographic mechanisms with embedded KR functionality should
be compatible with cryptographic products that do not make use of KR. These require-
ments will ensure that neither of the above scenarios will prevent the establishment of
a secure session.
6.4 Detailed description of the key recovery model
To identify those factors that can cause interoperability problems there is a need to
give a more detailed description of the KR model described in Section 2.2. In partic-
ular, we need to consider the two most important processes that take place during a
communication session, i.e. key generation and KR information generation.
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6.4.1 The key generation process
Prior to an encrypted communication session, data encryption keys must be established.
There are typically three options for this process.
1. Both entities contribute to the key generation process.
2. The key is generated by one of the communicating entities and either it is trans-
mitted to the peer by conventional means, or the peer is able to generate the
same key using some pre-agreed cryptographic values.
3. The session key is provided by a TTP, which in this case also serves the role of
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Figure 6.1: A typical KRM in relation to the key generation process
The above alternatives are represented in Figure 6.1 by the dashed arrows (which de-
note optional communications) between the key generation components of the three
entities that might contribute to the establishment of the data encryption keys. If the
KRA generates the session key on behalf of the user, A’s key generation component
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will only serve the role of communicating with the KRA’s key generation component.
The key will be provided by the KRA to entity A and transferred to B by some secure
means.
6.4.2 The key recovery information generation process
Every KRM, at some stage in its operation, will generate ‘KR information’ (which as
described in Section 2.2 has the form of a KRF or KR material), as required for key
recovery. The process of generating the KR information, in a form interpretable by
the KRA’s Key Recovery Process, is performed by the KR information generation
component, depicted in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: A typical KRM in relation to the KR information generation process
The dashed arrows to the KRF indicate that in some cases only one entity might
be required to generate the KRF, which is not restricted to conveying key material
– it can simply be data that uniquely identifies the session or the data encryption
keys. The KR material generated by the KRA can include data encryption keys or
key material that is not bound to a specific session (such as master keys, public key
agreement keys or private decryption keys). The interaction between the entity’s and
the KRA’s KR information generation might take place in every communication
session, occasionally, or only once, e.g. during the initialisation of the KRM.
113
Interoperability issues surrounding key recovery mechanisms
The key material in either A’s or B’s domain, which is input to the KR information
generation, represents either the output of key generation, i.e. the generated data
encryption key, or the input to this process (e.g. key components, master key, and/or
random values). The first case includes KRMs that make use of a key generated by
the underlying key establishment protocol, and as such can be independent of the key
establishment method. The second case includes mechanisms that are tightly bound
to the underlying key generation process, e.g. mechanisms where the KRA relies on a
particular key establishment process which it can reproduce and thereby recover keys.
Thus, depending on whether the key material is the output of, or the input to, the key
generation process, KRMs can be divided into those that are bound to this process
and those that are independent of it.
Unlike A’s and B’s KR information generation, which typically has to be executed
in every communication session, the corresponding process in the KRA’s domain might
have to be executed only during the initialisation phase of the scheme, or only a limited
number of times during the lifetime of the mechanism. In these latter cases the output
of KR information generation, i.e. the KR material, is likely to be used for the
recovery of multiple keys.
Finally, the Repository holds any additional information required by the KR informa-
tion generation process, such as A’s and B’s public key certificates.
6.5 Factors that can affect interoperability
Many KRMs, as previously mentioned, require the use of a specific mechanism for
the generation of the session keys, and as such they can be considered as part of
the key establishment protocol. This restriction is one of the factors that can cause
interoperability problems in the use of a KRM. A KRM with this property requires
compatibility of the communicating parties’ underlying key establishment protocols,
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a requirement that is not always fulfilled. Key escrow mechanisms suffer more from
this problem, as most of them demand the use of a specific key establishment protocol.
By contrast, key encapsulation schemes appear to be more adaptable in this respect,
since they simply wrap the generated data encryption key under the KRC’s public
encryption key (and hence potentially work with any key establishment protocol).
Flexibility of key encapsulation mechanisms with respect to the underlying key estab-
lishment protocols does not necessarily imply that interoperability problems do not
arise. Interoperability very much depends on what additional requirements exist on
their use. For example, interoperability problems arise if the recipient of encrypted
data needs to validate KR information, or the receiver relies on the sender to generate
KR information. These needs, which are likely to arise from policy requirements, will
typically demand interaction between the two communicating parties, e.g. exchanging
cryptographic values during the generation or verification of KR information. If either
party’s mechanism cannot cope with the demands of its peer, interoperability prob-
lems are likely to arise. This problem is not restricted to the use of key encapsulation
schemes. In the case of key escrow mechanisms, a requirement for participation of both
entities in the generation of KR information will have the same effect. We can therefore
divide KRMs into two classes, depending on their communications requirements during
the generation and verification of KR information.
1. KRMs where each entity generates KR information merely for its own needs with-
out the peer’s assistance. If neither party requires verification of the peer’s KR
information prior to decryption, interoperability issues become of minor impor-
tance and the two parties will be able to make use of their respective KRMs.
2. KRMs that require interaction between the two entities, which might be needed
in the following cases.
• Exchange of cryptographic material is required for KR information genera-
tion.
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• The sender generates KR information both for his own and his peer’s needs.
This is particularly relevant to single-message communications, such as email
or file transfer.
• Either party wishes, e.g. for policy reasons, to verify the KR information
generated by the peer.
In situations like these, interoperability is an issue that has to be taken into
account. Otherwise, it is likely to result in a failure to establish secure commu-
nications.
In summary, the two factors that are likely to affect the interoperability of KRMs in
encrypted communication sessions are:
1. the KRMs’ dependence on the underlying key establishment protocol, and
2. the interaction requirements between the communicating parties for the genera-
tion and/or verification of KR information.
6.6 Interoperable mechanisms
Based on the above analysis, a mechanism that is neither dependent on the underlying
key establishment protocol, nor needs any interaction with the peer for generation or
verification of KR information, will always be interoperable with a KRM with the
same requirements. The two mechanisms can work independently, and the two parties
can make use of them regardless of the underlying key establishment protocol. A key
encapsulation scheme where each entity encrypts the key generated by the underlying
key establishment protocol using the agent’s public key has this property. We assume,
of course, that neither entity requires its peer to verify the key recovery information,
and that the transmission of the KRF will not cause any problems to the recipient.
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A mechanism with these properties can also inter-operate with one that is dependent
on the underlying key establishment protocol, as long as the mechanism does not re-
quire peer interaction for KR information generation or verification. As an example,
consider the scenario where entity A makes use of a key escrow mechanism, where the
session key is generated using an escrowed master key and some additional information
made available to A’s agent, and the remote entity B uses a key encapsulation mech-
anism, while the generated key is transferred to B via a secure channel. As B has no
requirements for the key establishment process, and there is no interaction required to
generate the KR information, interoperability problems are not likely to arise, assuming
that verification of KR information by B is not required.
Yet, if B used the same key escrow mechanism there would be a conflict and the two
mechanisms could not inter-operate as the receiver would have no means to escrow
the generated key (which in this case is provided by the sender). The problem here is
that both KRMs demand the use of specific key establishment protocols, and therefore
the requirement for compatibility of the key establishment protocols becomes crucial
for the interoperability of the KRMs (a requirement that in this case is not fulfilled).
Thus, there are cases where even the same mechanism cannot be used simultaneously
by two parties. Hence, if both parties mandate the use of such a KRM then it will
potentially act as a barrier to secure communications.
Interoperability problems are likely to arise in the following cases (we assume that
the communicating parties can deal with all possible underlying key establishment
protocols):
1. Both KRMs demand the use of specific key establishment mechanisms regardless
of requirements for interaction. In this case, the interoperability of the KRMs
depends on the compatibility of the respective underlying key establishment pro-
tocols.
2. At least one KRM demands peer participation in the generation and/or verifi-
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cation of KR information. For instance, if policy restrictions demand that the
KR information for the receiver’s needs should be generated by the sender, it is
apparent that the sender must be able to cope with the receiver’s mechanism.
Otherwise, it is likely that establishment of secure communications will fail.
Given these scenarios, the chances of interoperability problems arising are considerable
and a solution has to be found.
6.7 A scheme proposed by the Key Recovery Alliance
To overcome the interoperability problems, the Key Recovery Alliance has proposed a
mechanism [28], which, when adopted, enables the establishment of secure communica-
tions between dissimilar KRMs. The mechanism introduces the common key recovery
block (CKRB), that “serves as a container for a single KR mechanism–specific KRF”.
According to [28] the CKRB achieves two main objectives; it “provides a means to
identify the KRM used to construct the KRF”, and “provides a range of validation
techniques, including those that allow validation of the KR information in generic, KR
mechanism–independent ways”. (Note that, in line with [28], throughout we simply
refer to KRB instead of CKRB)
Brief descriptions of the KRB and the KRB validation techniques are given below.
For full details and explanations of the mechanism, see [28]. The KRB consists of the
following fields:
• KRB Version Number: Set to 1 for the version of the common KRB format
specified in [28].
• KRB Length: The number of words in the entire KRB.
• Object Identifier (OID) for KRF: The OID for the KR mechanism used to
generate the KRF, as registered with a central authority.
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• Reserved: A 16-bit field reserved for future use.
• KRF Length: Number of words in the KRF.
• Key Recovery Field: The proprietary KRF whose format and contents are
indicated by the OID.
• Validation Field Type: Identifies one of the following eight techniques used to
compute the Validation Field.
1. NONE (Type 0): No Validation Field Value (VFV) is calculated; KRF
validation is unnecessary at the decrypting side.
2. SEMANTIC (Type 1): No VFV is calculated; the KRF should be vali-
dated semantically using the mechanism-specific algorithm.
3. PROTOCOL (Type 2): No VFV is calculated; the KRB need not be
checked for validity since the carrier protocol provides integrity protection
for the KRB.
4. CONF-HMAC-SHA–1-96 (Type 3): The VFV is a MAC of the KRB
using HMAC [47] and SHA-1 [52] and the confidentiality key associated with
the KRF.
5. CONF-HMAC-MD5-96 (Type 4): The VFV is a MAC of the KRB
using HMAC [47] and MD5 [51] and the confidentiality key associated with
the KRF.
6. INTEG-HMAC-SHA–1-96 (Type 5): The VFV is a MAC of the KRB
using HMAC and SHA-1 and the integrity key associated with the KRF.
7. INTEG-HMAC-MD5-96 (Type 6): The VFV is a MAC of the KRB
using HMAC and MD5 and the integrity key associated with the KRF.
8. SIGNATURE–PKCS7 (Type 7): The VFV is a PKCS7 signature block
that carries a digital signature, which is calculated on the hash of the KRB.
• Validation Field Length: Number of words in the VFV.
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• Validation Field Value: It is calculated over the entire KRB. If some of the
KRB fields are unknown at the time the Validation Field Value is calculated,
then:
– the KRB Length field is set to zero,
– the Validation Field Length is set to zero, and
– the Validation Field Value is omitted (it has a length of zero).
The length of the Validation Field Value is variable, but it is padded with zeros
to be an integral number of 32-bit words.
6.8 Remarks on Key Recovery Alliance’s CKRB format
As mentioned above, the mechanism proposed by the Key Recovery Alliance is intended
to promote interoperability between dissimilar mechanisms. However, two problems
can be identified with this mechanism. The first relates to difficulties arising from the
generation of proprietary KRFs, while the other concerns the fact that, in many cases,
the mechanism fails to provide interoperability.
6.8.1 KRF generation
The paper describing the Key Recovery Alliance mechanism, [28], makes the implicit
assumption that a KRF has already been generated and therefore is always available
for KRB generation. However, this is true only in a limited number of combinations
of the various KR schemes. In the case of non-interoperable mechanisms, the sender
might not be able to generate a KRF because the receiver does not fulfill the require-
ments of the sender’s KRM. A simple example of this problem is the case where KRF
generation requires the encryption of the secret session key (data encryption key) using
the receiver’s public key, which is escrowed with the receiver’s escrow agent. If the
receiver does not have a public key meeting the requirements of the sender’s KRM, e.g.
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because he is not using a key escrow mechanism, then the sender cannot generate a
KRF.
6.8.2 Interoperability issues
Among the Validation Field Types proposed in [28], there are five (types 2–6) which
provide validation of the KRB. According to [28], using the generic validation mecha-
nisms supported by the KRB, entity B would be able to validate the proprietary KRF
sent by A and vice versa, “even though B did not understand how to parse the KRF”.
However, the placement of the KRF within the KRB does not enable this validation.
The receiving entity still has to parse the KRF to check its validity. Moreover, the
integrity and/or authenticity of the KRB, and therefore of the content of the KRB, i.e.
the KRF, does not guarantee the KRF’s validity.
As a consequence, the validation techniques proposed are vulnerable to a single rogue
user scenario. Consider the case where two parties communicate using dissimilar (non-
interoperable) KRMs. Sender A generates a KRF for receiver B, who is not able to
verify the proprietary KRF using the method required by A’s KRM because he is using
a dissimilar KRM. Assuming further that A is a rogue user, then the following scenario
might arise.
Rogue user A generates an invalid KRF. However, the VFV is generated using the
valid session key (validation field types 3-6), which the receiver knows in advance. A
genuine receiver B will validate correctly the KRB, as this was correctly generated by
A. However, the validation technique and therefore the validation of the KR informa-
tion will fail because the KRF is not genuine, and B has no means to verify it (we
assume that the two mechanisms are not compatible and therefore B does not know
the semantic details of A’s KRM). Thus B will not be compliant with his policy, which
requires validation of the KRF prior to decryption of the encrypted data.
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Moreover, the agent with which A is associated will not be able to recover the key.
However, the KRB was accepted as valid by B. This problem arises because the KRB
validation mechanism only enables the recipient to verify the integrity and/or origin
of the KRF. The KRB scheme is not a “mechanism for verifying the validation of the
enclosed KRF” [28]. There is no way to recover the key from the KRB using only
the information provided by the KRB itself (excluding the KRF because this can be
manipulated only by the users that deploy the same KRM).
In the case of Validation Field Type 7, the same problem holds, as the VFV is a digital
signature on the KRB which can carry a nonvalid KRF. The only Validation Field types
that do not suffer from this problem are types 0 and 1 which demand “no validation”
and “mechanism specific validation” respectively.
Therefore, the solution proposed here does not achieve one of the two major objectives
mentioned above, which is to provide “the ability to validate the KR information in
a way that does not require knowledge of the exact semantic properties of the KRF”.
The solution fails to achieve its objective in situations where it is most desirable, i.e.
in environments where there is a lack of trust.
The KRMs where the KRF is equal to the key exchange block do not suffer from the
above problem, because in such a case the KRF has to be processed to obtain the
decryption key. However, these mechanisms still face the problem where the sender
might not be able to generate a KRF and, if one is generated, the receiving end might
not be able to parse it and get the session key. The KRB proposed does not offer
an alternative to this situation, since the receiver cannot obtain the session key using
interoperable components.
A different approach to the solution of the interoperability problem is described in the





The introduction of a large number of KRMs and their use in encrypted communi-
cations is likely to result in interoperability problems between key recovery enabled
cryptographic products. In this chapter, a detailed key recovery model has been de-
scribed and the factors that can cause interoperability problems have been identified.
A study of the model proposed by the Key Recovery Alliance to solve the interoperabil-
ity problem has revealed that this scheme does not achieve its major objective, which
is to provide interoperability between dissimilar mechanisms. This motivates the study
of alternative schemes, the subject of the next chapter in this thesis.
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In this chapter, a protocol is proposed which allows two communicating entities to
negotiate the key recovery mechanism(s) to be used, with the ultimate goal of providing
the parties the means to agree either on a mutually acceptable KRM or on different,
yet interoperable, mechanisms of their choice.
124
7.1 High-level description of the KRM negotiation protocol
7.1 High-level description of the KRM negotiation proto-
col
We now describe a protocol designed to enable two communicating parties to negotiate
the KRM(s) to be used in an encrypted communication session. Its main objective
is to deal with situations where the two parties might otherwise wish to make use of
different, non-interoperable, KRMs.
A similar protocol, specifically designed to allow the negotiation of key recovery mecha-
nisms using the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP),
is described in [3]. This protocol, however, uses the CKRB (described in the previ-
ous chapter) for the transmission of key recovery information, with which problems
have been identified (see Section 6.8). A more general protocol is described here that
considers the differing requirements of various mechanisms and potential additional
requirements for the exchange of cryptographic certificates. Moreover, the proposed
protocol can be used to provide key recovery functionality at the application layer, in
contrast to the Key Recovery Alliance scheme which targets the IP layer.
Note that in the protocol description we refer to the two parties as ‘Client’ and ‘Server’,
as opposed to our previous labels of A and B; this is so as to follow the client-server
model terminology as closely as possible. The approach is similar to the negotiation
of cryptographic parameters and establishment of a secure communication session in
TLS [19].
7.1.1 The proposed scheme
The protocol consists of the following steps (messages in Small Caps are optional;
more detailed descriptions of the exchanged messages are given in the next section).
• The client initiates the protocol by sending the ClientHello message to the server.
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Client ClientHello−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Server
• The server responds with his Hello message, the ServerHello.
Client ServerHello←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Server
With the ClientHello and ServerHello, the two entities exchange the parameters
necessary for KRM negotiation. After the ServerHello, the server sends the Cer-
tificate message to the client (if required by the selected KRM(s)) containing the
appropriate certificates
Client Certificate←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Server
and requests the corresponding client’s certificates with the CertificateRequest
message.
Client CertificateRequest←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Server
Following that, the server sends the ServerHelloDone message, which indicates
that the server has completed his Hello messages.
Client ServerHelloDone←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Server
• The client responds with the optional Certificate message, which contains the
certificates specified in the CertificateRequest,
Client Certificate−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Server
the optional KRParameters message which contains any additional information
required by the selected KRMs,
Client KRParameters−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Server
and finally the Finished message, which indicates that the client has completed
the negotiation of the mechanisms.
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Client Finished−−−−−−−−−−−→ Server
• The server verifies the received Finished message, and if the check succeeds it
responds with a similar Finished message.
Client Finished←−−−−−−−−−−− Server
On receipt of this message the client verifies it and, if the verification succeeds, the
negotiation protocol terminates successfully.
7.1.2 Exchanged messages
In the following sections the exchanged messages are described in detail.
7.1.2.1 Client Hello
The client, as previously mentioned, initiates the protocol by sending the first message
of the negotiation protocol (ClientHello). The ClientHello contains a list of KRMs
(from a complete list of mechanisms the protocol supports) that the client is able and
willing to use, in decreasing order of preference. A default mechanism that all parties
are assumed to be able to cope with, and which can serve as a worst case solution, can
be included in the list.
With the ClientHello, the client must also inform the server whether he wants to resume
a previous session, by including the appropriate identifier in the corresponding field. If
this field is left empty, a new session id should be assigned by the server.
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7.1.2.2 Server Hello
If the client does not request the resumption of a previous session, or if the server wants
to initiate a new one, the server must assign a new session id, which will be included in
the corresponding field and sent with the ServerHello message. Otherwise, the server
will respond with the session id included in the ClientHello and proceed with the Finish
message.
If the server initiates a new session, he sends the selection of the KRM that he wants
the client to use, and the KRM that the server will use. The two mechanisms, if not
identical, have to be interoperable. For this purpose, a list of all possible matches
of interoperable mechanisms has to be kept by both communicating entities. If an
acceptable match is not found in the list, the server can either terminate the negotiation
protocol unsuccessfully, or choose the default mechanism if this was included in the list
received from the client. Otherwise the server can drop the session.
If the selection of the mechanism for both entities is a KRM that can itself handle the
exchange of certificates and related KR parameters, the two parties can terminate the
negotiation protocol and leave this KRM to take charge. To achieve this, the server
will send a Finish message (after the ServerHello) to indicate that control is now to be
passed to the negotiated KRM(s).
Finally, within the ServerHello, the server also includes the KRParameters field, which
carries any additional information that the client has to possess to be able to deal with
the server’s KRM.
7.1.2.3 Certificate and KRM related information exchange
Depending on the selection of the KRM, and if the server has not sent a Finish mes-
sage, the server proceeds with the Certificate message. This message is optional and
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contains the required certificates (for the chosen mechanisms) for the generation and/or
verification of KR information. Following that, and depending on the requirements of
the chosen KRM(s), the server can also send a request for the corresponding client’s
certificates using the CertificateRequest. The purpose of the CertificateRequest is to
give the client a list of specific types of certificates needed by the server, and a list of
certification authorities trusted by the server. After the CertificateRequest, the server
sends the ServerHelloDone message, which indicates that the server has completed his
Hello messages.
On receipt of the ServerHelloDone, if the client has received a CertificateRequest he
responds with his Certificate message, which contains the requested certificates, assum-
ing that he is in possession of the appropriate ones. Further, the client sends in the
optional KRParameters message any additional information required by the selected
for the client KRM. Note that the corresponding KRParameters for the server’s KRM
is sent as part of the ServerHello message.
7.1.2.4 Finish messages
If the client is satisfied with the current selection of mechanisms he sends the Finish
message, which indicates that the client is willing to proceed with the current selection
of mechanisms. Subsequently, the client waits for the corresponding server’s Finish
message, whose receipt indicates successful execution of the protocol.
7.2 Avoiding modification of the Hello messages by an
adversary
After the execution of the above protocol, the two entities are not sure whether any
of the exchanged messages have been altered during transmission by an adversary, as
the specified protocol includes no proper integrity checks. Moreover, neither of the
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communicating parties authenticates the other. Assuming, however, that the KRMs
that can be negotiated are sound, the protocol does not introduce any vulnerabilities
to the secrecy of the session key. The only attack that an adversary can mount against
the protocol is to alter the Hello messages exchanged between the two entities in an
attempt to downgrade the negotiated KRM(s) to one(s) that the attacker regards as
weaker. Such an attack will only force the two entities to make use of less favourable
mechanisms.
To avoid such problems, we propose enhancing the previously proposed protocol. These
enhancements provide the following security services.
• Integrity of the exchanged messages.
• Assurance that the Hello messages exchanged are not a replay from a previous
session.
Additionally, the mechanism provides mutual authentication of the communicating par-
ties. Note, however, that mutual authentication is not a requirement for the negotiation
protocol. It is a property derived from the use of digital signatures. The modifications
proposed are as follows.
• The client generates a random value randC, which he sends to the server with
the ClientHello message.
• The server generates a random value randS, which he sends to the client with
the ServerHello message.
• The client’s Finish message becomes
SC(ClientHello ‖ ServerHello ‖ randC ‖ randS)
and the server’s Finish message becomes
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SS(ServerHello ‖ ClientHello ‖ randS ‖ randC)
where SU (M) is U ’s signature on data M and “‖” denotes concatenation.
The rest of the messages remain as previously defined. On receipt of the respective
Finishmessages the two entities check the signatures and if either of the two verification
checks fails the protocol terminates unsuccessfully (this indicates that at least one of the
ClientHello, ServerHello might have been altered during transmission). The modified
protocol deals with the threat of modification of the exchanged Hello messages by an
adversary. The generated random values prevent against replay attacks, i.e. where
an adversary uses old exchanged messages to subvert the protocol. The cost of this
countermeasure, however, is the introduction of signatures, which have to be supported
by an appropriate public key infrastructure.
In a practical implementation of the protocol the two variants can actually co-exist and
the two parties will be able to select the mode to be used. More specifically, an extra
field in the Hello messages can be used to indicate whether the two entities possess
the appropriate certificates and therefore are willing to use the second variant of the
protocol.
7.3 Properties and discussion
The proposed protocol offers the communicating parties a means of negotiating the
KRMs to be used for their encrypted communications. Given that this negotiation
will affect the selection of the key establishment protocol, execution of the proposed
protocol must take place before the establishment of any session keys. It might also be
the case that the two entities are obliged to use a specific key establishment protocol.
This will simply restrict the number of mechanisms that the two entities will be able
to negotiate.
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The negotiating entities will be able to choose different KRMs as long as there are no
conflicts between the underlying key establishment mechanisms. Therefore, the choice
of the key recovery mechanism(s) will only be affected by the compatibility of the
underlying key establishment protocols. If these are compatible, the two parties will be
able to use the negotiated KRMs, overcoming efficiently any interoperability problems
that the two parties would have otherwise faced.
Finally, note that in order to achieve the degree of agreement needed, the KRM nego-
tiation process and the KRMs to be negotiated need to be subject of a standardisation
process of some type (e.g. via the IETF). This standard will need to include agreed
identifiers for a large set of KRMs.
7.4 Summary
A new KRM negotiation protocol has been described which follows a different approach
to the scheme proposed by the Key Recovery Alliance. The new protocol gives the
communicating parties the ability to negotiate the KRM(s) to be used. The protocol
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In this chapter a ‘fair’ key generation and certification protocol for Diffie-Hellman keys
is proposed, which is intended for use in cases where neither user nor certification
authority are trusted to choose the user’s key on their own. This protocol also ensures
that key agreement mechanism 1 in ISO/IEC 11770-3 [38] provides ‘fair key agreement’
[63] and prevents unfair key recovery by either of the communicating parties.
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8.1 Fair key agreement
In the multi-part international standard ISO/IEC 11770, a number of key establishment
techniques are described. Key establishment, as defined in ISO/IEC 11770-3 [38], is
“the process of making available a shared secret key to one or more entities”, and it can
be subdivided into key transport and key agreement. Key agreement is “the process
of establishing a shared secret key between entities in such a way that neither of them
can predetermine the value of that key” [38]. This definition implies that the shared
secret is derived as a function of the information contributed by, or associated with, all
the communicating parties such that none of them can predetermine the value of the
key [59].
Key agreement mechanisms are used in environments where the communicating parties,
who may not trust one another, wish to be sure that a session key used to protect
communications between them is derived so that neither of the communicating parties
can predetermine some number of bits in the session key or all of its value. As briefly
discussed in [63], the mechanisms described in ISO/IEC 11770-3 [38], clause 6, and
11770-2 [37], clauses 5.5 and 5.6, do not provide ‘fair key agreement’, as they do not
prevent one of the communicating entities from choosing part of the shared secret key.
The basic idea behind most key agreement protocols, and certainly all the protocols
described in ISO/IEC 11770, is that both parties provide a ‘key component’, and the
two components are combined in some way to give the key. The method used to
combine the components is typically a one-way function. As mentioned in ISO/IEC
11770-3 [38], certain checks, depending on the particular key agreement mechanism
and/or cryptographic functions used, should also be enforced to prevent the use of
weak values (key components).
However, in the mechanisms in the above standards, neither the use of a one-way
‘combiner’ function nor these checks can prevent one entity gaining an advantage over
135
A fair certification protocol
the other. Suppose, as is the case with most such schemes, one entity (A say) sends
its component to the other entity (B say) before B sends its component back to A.
There is then nothing to stop B from working on the key component received from A
prior to choosing its own component, allowing B to choose part of the shared secret
key. Specifically, “if B is prepared to perform approximately 2s computations of the
one-way function used to combine key components prior to sending a response to A,
then B will be able to choose s bits of the shared secret key” [63]. The computation of
the combinations has to be performed within the limited space of time that B has prior
to sending a response back to A. Yet, if a fast hash function, such as SHA-1, is used
to combine components, B may be able to test as many as 104 − 105 key components
in a second or so, allowing him to choose as many as 16 bits of the shared secret key.
Before proceeding, we consider why allowing one of the two entities to choose a few bits
of the shared key might be a threat. Suppose entity B has agreed to allow party C to
have access to his keys for key recovery purposes, but B does not wish to let A know.
Moreover, although this could be achieved by having B pass a copy of every key to C,
this is potentially costly in communications and storage, and B and C wish to find an
alternative. Suppose that the keys agreed between A and B are 64 bits long. Then,
using essentially the same technique as described in [63], B may be in a position to
choose every key shared with A such that the last 16 bits are a fixed function (known
only by B and C) of the first 48 bits. When C wishes to recover a key, C needs only
test at most 248 possibilities for the key (e.g. using a known plaintext/ciphertext pair).
8.2 The commitments solution
To avoid the above problem, the use of commitments is proposed in [63]. The notion of
commitments in cryptographic protocols is a well-established one, particularly in the
context of zero-knowledge protocols (see, for example, [59]). By a commitment here we
mean the disclosure of a value by an entity which binds that entity to a related value,
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without revealing that related value (in some contexts the disclosed value is referred
to as a witness). The main idea behind using commitments to make key agreement
schemes fair is to ensure that both parties choose their own key component before seeing
the other party’s component. This is achieved by requiring one entity, say B, to hash
its key component using a one-way hash function, and to send the resulting hash-code
as the commitment to the other entity, say A, before A sends its own key component
to B. Assuming that the key component contains sufficiently many bits, A cannot
calculate B’s key component before choosing its own. Therefore, A has to generate
and send its own key component without seeing the exact value of B’s component.
After that, B can pass its key component back to A, who hashes the value and checks
whether the newly computed hash-value matches the previously provided commitment.
Most of the standardised key agreement mechanisms described in ISO/IEC 11770-2
[37] and 11770-3 [38] can easily be adapted, using commitments, to provide ‘fair key
agreement’. However, of the seven key agreement methods specified in ISO/IEC 11770-
3, the use of the commitment-based solution only applies to four of them; it does not
work for the mechanisms involving use of pre-established key agreement key pairs (key
agreement mechanisms 1–3 in ISO/IEC 11770-3). The main reason is that if one of
the communicating parties has a public key agreement key certified by a certification
authority (CA), the other party can work on it for a long period of time before choosing
its key component.
In this chapter, we consider key agreement mechanism 1 in ISO/IEC 11770-3 and
provide a solution to the ‘fair key agreement’ problem for this scheme. The proposed
solution could more generally serve as a ‘fair certification protocol’ for Diffie-Hellman
keys where the user does not choose his private key, but neither is the private key
released to the CA. The mechanism could be deployed in environments where neither
the CA nor the user trust each other to choose the user’s key.
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8.3 Key agreement using public key cryptography
Before describing the new method for ‘fair key agreement’, we consider the existing
mechanisms in more detail.
In the key agreement mechanisms described in ISO/IEC 11770-3 [38], both commu-
nicating parties contribute to the shared secret key, which is computed as a one-way
function of the key components that the parties have chosen. The requirements for
use of the mechanisms are given in ISO/IEC 11770-3 clauses 5 and 6. Most impor-
tantly, entities A and B using one of these protocols must have agreed on a function
F : H ×G→ G, with the following properties.
1. F satisfies the commutativity condition F (hA, F (hB, g)) = F (hB, F (hA, g)).
2. It is computationally intractable to find F (h1, F (h2, g)) from F (h1, g), F (h2, g)
and g. This implies that F (·, g) is a one-way function.
Also A and B must share an element g in G, which may be publicly known, and A and
B must be able to efficiently compute values F (h, g), and must also be able to generate
random elements in H. One ‘obvious’ candidate for F is to choose a large prime p, put
G = Zp, put H = Z∗p , let g be an element of large prime multiplicative order modulo
p, and define
F (h, g) = gh mod p.
The seven key agreement mechanisms specified in ISO/IEC 11770-3 [38] can be divided
into three classes.
• In one scheme (mechanism 1) the shared secret key is generated as a function of
the two parties’ pre-established key agreement keys. According to mechanism 1
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two entities A and B non-interactively establish a shared secret key using their
key agreement key pairs. Use of the mechanism requires each entity X to have
a private key agreement key hX in H and a public key agreement key pX =
F (hX , g), and both entities to have an authenticated copy of each other’s public
key agreement key [38, clause 6.1]. The mechanism involves the following steps:
1. A computes, using its own private key agreement key hA and B’s public key
agreement key pB, the shared secret key as KAB = F (hA, pB).
2. B computes, using its own private key agreement key hB and A’s public key
agreement key pA, the shared secret key as KAB = F (hB, pA).
• In two schemes (mechanisms 2 and 3) the shared secret key is generated as a
function of one party’s pre-established key agreement key, and the other party’s
dynamically generated component.
• In the other four schemes (mechanisms 4–7) the shared secret key is computed
as function of two dynamically generated components, one for each party.
As already discussed, the ‘commitments’ solution only applies to the third class of
mechanisms. The fairness problem arises in the first class of mechanisms because one
party may select his/her key agreement key pair so as to choose part of the key shared
with another specified entity. Suppose entity A generates and publishes his public key
agreement key. When B chooses his key agreement key he can ensure that the key
established between A and B has certain properties. Of course, B has no control over
keys established between himself and other entities, so the problem is restricted in
scope. Nevertheless, B potentially has a long time in which to work on A’s key before
choosing his own, and in this respect the problem is worse than for mechanisms 4–7.
We now propose a solution to this problem for the first class of mechanisms, based on
the idea of preventing a user choosing his/her key pair, whilst preserving the secrecy
of the user’s private key.
Finally note that we do not have a solution to the problem for the second class of
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mechanisms. This case appears particularly intractable, and if the lack of ‘fairness’ is
a major problem then a mechanism from one of the other two classes should be used.
8.4 A fair key generation and certification protocol
We present a protocol between an entity and a CA which provides the entity with a
private key and a certified public key, where the user cannot choose his/her private key
but also no other entity (including the CA) knows the private key. Use of the proposed
certification and key derivation mechanism requires the user and CA to share a secure
channel and have agreed a modulus (a large prime number p), an element g of large
prime multiplicative order modulo p, and a collision-resistant hash-function h. The
values p, g and h would typically be shared by a large domain of users, and could be
distributed as part of an implementation of the scheme. Alternatively, the agreement
of these values could be done using one of the mechanisms proposed in [59]. Note also
that the secure channel might simply be a physical link between a user PC and the
CA’s registration system, set up at the time the user physically registers with the CA.
The proposed protocol consists of the following steps.




• The CA chooses a second private key component y, and also computes y−1 mod
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• The CA computes h((gxy)y−1 mod p) and checks that the result equals the value
sent by U in the first message. If the check is successful the CA accepts gxy mod p
as the public key of U , certifies it, and returns the certificate to the user.
U
CertCA(gxy)←−−−−−−−−−−−−− CA (8.4)
Theorem 1 The above protocol has the following properties, assuming that the dis-
crete logarithm problem is intractable, that g has multiplicative order q modulo p where
q is a large prime, that the CA chooses y uniformly at random from the set of possible
values, and that the hash-function h is one-way.
1. The user cannot choose his private key.
2. The CA does not know the value of the user’s private key.
Proof
1. The user chooses x before y is chosen, and because of the one-way property of h
cannot change x once it has been chosen. As y ranges over the full set of possible
values, so does (xy mod q), and hence xy is equally likely to be any of the set of
possible values.
2. Suppose that, given h(gx), y and gxy mod p, it is feasible to find xy (for any x
and y), i.e. suppose claim (2) is not true. This is equivalent to saying that given
gz mod p and a value y such that z = xy for some (unknown) x, then it is feasible
to find z. (Note that h(gx) is of no value since it can be computed from y and
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gxy mod p). However, the information regarding the value y is of no value at all,
since given any value y∗, there will exist a value x∗ such that x∗y∗ = z. Hence
the assumption is equivalent to saying that given gz mod p then it is feasible to
find z, which contradicts our assumption that the discrete logarithm problem is
hard [59].
Use of this protocol for the establishment and certification of all the users’ key agree-
ment keys ensures that a user cannot influence a key established with another user.
In other words, the protocol prevents the user choosing his key agreement key to have
certain specific properties [63]. Thus, in particular, B will not be able to choose part
of the shared secret key established between A and himself, even if B has a long time
to work on A’s public key agreement key. However, although the user cannot control
the generation of his key agreement key, the user’s privacy is protected as neither the
CA nor any other entity get knowledge of the generated private key agreement key.
It is also clear that, through the use of ‘commitments’, the CA cannot choose part
of the final key. This mechanism, as mentioned earlier, could more generally serve
as a fair certification protocol for Diffie-Hellman keys in cases where neither user nor
CA is trusted to choose the user’s private key ‘on their own’. As long as one party’s
contribution is random, the resulting key will be ‘good’.
The value of g will typically be fixed for a particular application. If the multiplicative
order of g (q say, where q | (p− 1)) is non-prime, as would be the case if g were chosen
to be primitive, then the user can have an influence on the value of their private key,
albeit at the cost of choosing a rather ‘weak’ key. To see how this might arise, suppose
r is a small prime dividing q. The user now chooses x so that gx has order r. This
is easily achieved by choosing a random value z (0 < z < r) and putting x = zq/r.
Whatever the CA chooses as the value y, the final private key will be one of a set of r
possible values. To avoid this pathological case it is necessary to choose q to be prime,




In this chapter we looked at key recovery from an entirely different perspective, which is
the prevention of unfair key recovery. A protocol has been proposed that prevents either
of two communicating parties using one of the key agreement mechanisms described in
ISO/IEC 11770-3 [38] from choosing the generated key, while enabling a covert channel
for key recovery by a third party. The protocol provides fair key agreement for this
standardised mechanism, for which the commitments based solution proposed in [63]
does not apply.
The new protocol can also serve as a certification protocol for Diffie-Hellman keys. The
protocol enables a user to be provided with a certificate for a Diffie-Hellman public key
such that the user does not choose his/her private key, but neither is this private key
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In this chapter certain modifications to the ASPeCT (Advanced Security for Personal
Communications Technology) authentication and initialisation of payment protocols
are described that give them a key recovery capability. The two proposed solutions fulfil
potential government demands for lawful interception of encrypted communications,
while protecting the user from unauthorised disclosure of his/her communications.
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9.1 Lawful interception of telecommunications in UMTS
Almost since the first introduction of public telecommunications networks, govern-
ments have demanded a lawful interception capability, mainly for the investigation of
serious crime and for national security reasons. Laws of many countries and regional
institutions (e.g. European Union) mandate the existence of a capability for lawful in-
terception of traffic and related information, and this is typically part of the licensing
and operational conditions of network operators [21]. Until the widespread employment
of encryption for the protection of communications became possible, access to data was
just a matter of line-tapping or listening to the air interface. The introduction of con-
fidentiality services for protecting communications, however, has driven governments
to try and find means of accessing encrypted data. One possible solution is the use of
key recovery (escrow) services.
In a Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) [88] environment many
types of data might be involved, not just the ‘voice’ data found in GSM. In UMTS,
communicated data comprises all forms of data that can be generated by user ap-
plications (emails, messages), signalling data (charging and billing), or control data
(routing data, network access data). Recovery of transient keys, used for protection of
the communicated data, is designed to meet LEA needs for lawful interception of com-
munications. Intercepted information comprises both the content of communication
and intercept related information, which is call related and non-call related information
[23].
Among the authentication schemes proposed for a third generation mobile communi-
cation system (3GMS) were the ones designed and implemented by the collaborative
research project ASPeCT [2]. In this chapter certain modifications to the ASPeCT
authentication and initialisation of payment protocols are proposed that give them a
key recovery capability. The solutions were proposed to assist the international deploy-
ment of the ASPeCT protocol, by meeting potential government demands for lawful
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interception of encrypted communications.
9.2 The ASPeCT authentication and initialisation of pay-
ment protocol
The ASPeCT authentication and initialisation of payment (AIP) protocol [34] was
developed for authentication between a user U and a value added service provider
(VASP) V in UMTS environments. One of the basic properties of the AIP protocol is
the establishment of a secret session key K which can be used to encrypt subsequent
communications between the two entities. Two basic models have been designed for
this purpose (B and C variants). The main difference between the B and C variants is
the use in the C variant of an on-line TTP which serves as U ’s certification authority.
9.2.1 Preliminaries
Both variants are presented using similar notation, and both rely on certain pre-agreed
‘domain parameters’. In particular, it is assumed that U and V share Diffie-Hellman
key exchange parameters, including a modulus p and a ‘base’ g (where g is an element
of large prime multiplicative order modulo p). For simplicity of presentation we write
ga for (ga mod p) throughout; U and V must also share a set of agreed cryptographic
functions as follows.
• Collision-resistant hash-functions h1, h2, and h3;
• A (pseudo–)random number generator;
• A symmetric encryption function where {M}K denotes encryption of messageM
using key K;
• A public system parameter T which gives the maximum number of ‘ticks’, i.e.
the maximum transaction value, to which the user can commit himself by one
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signature;
• A family of length-preserving one-way functions Fx, where a ‘length-preserving
one-way function’ is a one-way function that inputs and outputs bit strings of
the same length. For any positive integer i we write F ix for the ith power of Fx,
i.e. the result of iteratively applying Fx a total of i times. Note that T and F
are used only for the needs of the payment protocol which is performed after the
AIP protocol described here.
Finally note that, as elsewhere in this thesis, we use ‖ to denote concatenation of data
items.
9.2.2 Authentication without an on-line TTP (B–Variant)
This variant of the AIP protocol assumes that U is in possession of a valid certificate
for V ’s public key agreement key and V has a valid certificate on the public key of U ’s
asymmetric signature system. A detailed description of this model is given in [34] and
the messages exchanged are specified in Figure 9.1.
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Figure 9.1: ASPeCT AIP Protocol (B–Variant)
In this protocol, U generates a random number u, computes gu and sends it to V ,
together with the identity idCAV of the authority whose certificates U can verify. On
receipt of the first message, V generates a random number r and computes a session
key K = h1((gu)v ‖ r), where v is V ’s secret key agreement key. V then sends U
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the number r, the hash value h2(K ‖ r ‖ idV ) (where idV is an identifier for V ), its
certificate certV , a time-stamp TV , and charging-relevant data ch data. On receipt of
the second message, U computes the key K = h1((gv)u ‖ r), recomputes the hashed
value h2(K ‖ r ‖ idV ) and compares it with the one received. If the check succeeds, U
generates random numbers IV and α0, computes αT = F TIV (α0) and signs the message
shown in Figure 9.1, including IV and αT . U then concatenates the signature with
his certificate certU , αT , and IV , encrypts the concatenated parameters with K, and
sends the encrypted message to V .
9.2.3 Authentication with an on-line TTP (C–Variant)
The second authentication protocol involves an on-line TTP. The main role of the
TTP is real-time verification of certificates and to ensure that both the user and the
VASP are able to verify each other’s certificates. A brief description of the ASPeCT
authentication protocol with on-line TTP is provided here. It is based on the protocol
published in [33] and has been enhanced to prevent a content verification attack (see
[56] and [32]). The messages exchanged are specified in Figure 9.2 and a full description
and analysis of the protocol is given in [34].
 USER U        VASP V TTP
L
u idUidTTPg }{||||
     certVidUg Lu ||}{||
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Figure 9.2: ASPeCT AIP Protocol (C–Variant)
In this variant of the protocol, U generates a random number u, computes gu and sends
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it to V , together with the identity idTTP of his TTP and his own identity idU encrypted
under session key L = guw, where gw is the TTP’s public key agreement key. As soon
as V receives the first message it connects to U ’s TTP and forwards the message sent by
U together with its certificate CertV . On receipt of the second authentication message
the TTP checks whether U ’s, and optionally V ’s, certificates have been revoked. If
both certificates are still valid, the TTP generates the certificate chains and sends
them back, together with a time-stamp TT, and a signature on the concatenation of
the certificate identifiers cidU and cidV, the time-stamp TT and the random number
gu. V verifies CertChain(V,U) and the signature using the TTP’s public key which it
retrieves from CertChain(V, T ). It then generates a random number r and computes
the session key K and a hash value on K, concatenated with the random number r
and V ’s identity idV. V also encrypts the signature with key K.
This encryption was incorporated in order to prevent a content verification attack in
the air interface. V then forwards to U the encrypted signature together with the
hash value h2(K ‖ r ‖ idV ), the cross-certificate for V ’s public key CertChain(U, V ),
the random number r, the time-stamp TT and charge data ch data. On receipt of
the fourth authentication message U decrypts the signature, checks its validity and
that of the cross-certificate. If the checks are successful U responds with the fifth
authentication message (exactly as in the B-variant).
9.3 Requirements and goals for key recovery in the AS-
PeCT protocol
As mentioned earlier, the AIP protocol establishes a secret session key K = h1(guv, r).
This key can be used to encrypt subsequent communications between U and V . The
aim of the modifications proposed below is to give authorised entities access to the
generated session key K. This transient key will be the only target of the key recovery
mechanism.
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One of the main requirements for the key recovery mechanism is to minimise any
additional computational overhead at the user end. This is desirable because all the
user computations are typically performed by a smart card. An effective solution
would therefore be to make the key recovery mechanism part of the key establishment
process. The proposed key recovery mechanism, however, should not affect the key
establishment process nor any of the desirable properties of the existing protocol. More
importantly, it must not reduce the strength of the cryptographic system nor introduce
any vulnerabilities into the protocol. The system should also be able to provide the
recovered material within a very limited time period.
A key recovery mechanism that enables LEA access to plaintext should also protect the
user against unauthorised access to subsequently, or previously, communicated data.
Such a risk could arise if the recovered key has a greater lifetime than the period for
which the LEA has authorized access to communicated data [22].
Two different solutions to the key recovery problem are proposed. Although both
solutions apply to both basic models of the ASPeCT protocol (B and C variants), for
brevity we apply only one solution to each model.
9.4 Giving a key recovery capability to the B-variant
The first variant of the protocol examined is the B-variant described in Section 9.2.2.
This protocol can be given a key recovery capability by slightly modifying the way that
U ’s key component u is generated. Note that, in the existing variants of the protocol,
the value u is chosen at random by U prior to the start of the protocol.
The user’s key component generation becomes a two-phase procedure. First, there is a
key recovery registration phase where the user registers an initial secret value ku with
his TTP in an escrow-like mechanism. Second, each time the user wants to generate a
key component he generates a random (or serial) number s and combines s and ku to
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get the key component u. That is, u = f(ku, s) where f should be a one way function.
In order for the TTP to be able to compute the value u, U has to send the TTP
its identity idU and the value s encrypted under L = (gw)u, where gw is the TTP’s
public key agreement key. Hence, the modified scheme requires the TTP to have a key
agreement key, as in the C-variant. The modified first message is as specified in Figure
9.3 (the other messages are as previously; see Figure 9.1).
USER U VASP V
Ls||idU }{|||| idCAVg u
Figure 9.3: Modified B-variant Protocol
In U ’s domain, the keys can be recovered as follows.
• The entity requesting key recovery has to pass the following intercepted values
to U ’s TTP, which acts as a KRA:
1. The one-time random value gu, V ’s certificate certV , the random value r
and the encrypted string {idU ‖ s}L. The TTP, using the value gu and its
private key agreement key w, can compute the session key L and therefore
decrypt the encrypted string {idU ‖ s}L. The value idU will help the TTP
identify the user and hence retrieve the stored secret ku. This will enable
the TTP to compute the value u and, already having the values r and gv,
to recover the key K and send it to the requesting entity.
2. The last authentication message sent by U to V together with the charging
data ch data and the time-stamp TV. These values will help the TTP verify
U ’s signature so that it can check that the request is within the scope of the
warrant.
In V ’s domain, however, the procedure is slightly different. This is because it would
typically not be desirable to send the user’s secret key component to V ’s TTP (espe-
cially when U ’s and V ’s TTPs are in different domains or simply if V ’s TTP is not
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trusted by the user). Therefore, V has to register the private key agreement key v with
its TTP. This can be done at the time that a certificate on the public key agreement
key gv is requested and issued. However, the key recovery procedure followed by V ’s
TTP is almost the same as the one described above. The only difference is the way
that V ’s TTP recovers the session key, i.e. it uses V ’s private key v and the value gu
to directly compute the session key K.
It should be noted that the value s could also be sent in clear (and not encrypted under
L). In such a case the function f must have the property that, given the input value s,
an adversary cannot get any information on the output u (without knowledge of ku).
More generally, if s is sent in clear, a second one-way function f∗ could be employed to
increase flexibility. The user would keep a long term secret k∗u (also known to the user’s
TTP). From this value the user would compute a ‘fixed term’ secret ku, by combining
k∗u and a date stamp using f∗. In such a case the TTP could disclose the value ku for a
particular time period to the intercepting authority, and would thereby only reveal the
user’s key values u for a fixed time interval. However, the flexibility provided in the
user’s domain is not available in V ’s domain, since if V ’s private key agreement key v
is revealed, then all previous and subsequent communications to and from the VASP
can be decrypted. In most scenarios this will be inappropriate, so the TTP must only
pass the session key K to the entity requesting recovery.
9.5 C-variant protocol with key recovery capability
In this section another solution to the key recovery problem is proposed which, as men-
tioned earlier, can also apply to the B–Variant. Essentially, this variant can be given
a key recovery capability simply by passing the TTP the key component u encrypted
under the secret key L. This gives the TTP the ability to recover the key K. With
this change, the first two messages of the enhanced protocol are as shown in Figure 9.4
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(where the other messages are as previously; see Figure 9.2).
USER U       VASP V              TTP
     L
u idUidTTPg }||{|||| u
         certVidUg Lu ||}||{|| u
Figure 9.4: Modified C-Variant Protocol
As previously mentioned, in this solution U simply passes to its TTP the generated key
component u encrypted under L. Thus, when intercepting the communication between
the user and the VASP, all the information needed by the user’s TTP to compute the
session key K is available. The key recovery procedure is almost the same as in the
previous solution in both U ’s and V ’s domain except for the session keyK computation
and the fact that the TTP’s signature is sufficient to check that the request is within
the scope of the warrant. Thus, in the user’s domain the entity requesting key recovery
has to give the following intercepted values to the TTP:
1. The one-time random value gu, the certificate chain CertChain(U, V ), the ran-
dom number r, and the encrypted string {idU ‖ u}L. The TTP, using the value
gu and its private key agreement key w, can compute the session key L and there-
fore decrypt the encrypted string {idU ‖ u}L. Having also the values r and gv,
the TTP will be able to recover the key K and send it to the requesting entity.
2. The time-stamp TT together with the TTP’s signature. These will enable the
TTP to verify that the request is within the scope of the warrant. As mentioned
earlier, this signature contains all the information the TTP needs to make this
verification and there is no need to give the TTP the last authentication message.
In V ’s domain the key recovery procedure is the same as in U ’s domain. However, as
with the previous solution, V has to register the private key agreement key v with its
TTP.
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9.6 Properties and discussion
The main aim of the two solutions described is to give authorised entities access to
transient keys and therefore access to communications. It should be noted that it is
not only LEAs that might benefit from such a property. Consider an employee who is
using a company’s device for his communications. It is clear that the company could
legitimately wish to discover what purposes this device is being used for. Key recovery
for the session key could come to serve this purpose and therefore protect business.
One of the main concerns in the design of key recovery mechanisms that give LEAs
access to plaintext, is the protection of the user from subsequent unauthorised access
to his/her communicated data. Problems could arise if the recovered key has a greater
lifetime than the period for which a LEA has authorised access to communicated data.
The solutions described prohibit such unauthorised listening to communications. In the
second solution only session keys are recovered, which means that LEAs can decrypt
only the communication sessions they are authorised to. However, if the value s is
sent in clear, the first solution gives more flexibility in the user’s domain in terms of
time-bounding recovered keys.
Finally note that the existence of an on-line TTP helps avoid single rogue user attacks
in U ’s domain. If there is a strong requirement for the prevention of such attacks, the
TTP might check whether the encrypted value u corresponds to the public value gu it
receives in the second authentication message. This check is not possible if there is no
on-line TTP (B–Variant).
9.7 Summary
In this chapter two mechanisms were proposed that give the ASPeCT authentication
and initialisation of payment protocols a key recovery capability. The modified pro-
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tocols enable warranted law enforcement access to encrypted communications while
protecting the user from further unauthorised disclosure of his/her data.
The intention of the proposed solutions was to assist the international deployment of
the ASPeCT infrastructure, given potential government requirements for provision of
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This final chapter summarises the primary contributions of this thesis and concludes
with suggestions for future work.
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10.1 Contributions and findings
This thesis has investigated the use of key recovery mechanisms primarily in a busi-
ness environment. Within this context we identified the threats that motivate the
deployment of a key recovery mechanism as a countermeasure. More specifically, we
discussed the threat of lack of access to decryption keys arising from deliberate actions
by disgruntled employees, or because of accidents, such as the failure of devices used
for storing decryption keys. Loss of decryption keys leads to an inability to access
potentially valuable information, a situation that corporations will typically not wish
to tolerate. In addition, authorised access to encrypted communications might also be
needed by a corporation wishing to run checks, either on incoming traffic for malicious
data or on outgoing communications for leakage of sensitive information.
The outcome of this introductory investigation was that key recovery can be an essential
tool for corporations and enterprises, and can be considered as part of their disaster
recovery planning. Key recovery in a business environment can provide benefits to
individual users as well as to the business as whole. The ethical issues arising from the
use of key recovery in a business environment also appear less difficult than those arising
from its proposed use by law enforcement agencies, which have aroused considerable
disquiet.
Using the identified threats, we specified the requirements that a key recovery mech-
anism should satisfy when deployed in a business environment. While most of these
requirements are likely to be important, some of them are less important than others,
and their criticality is mainly affected by the nature of the target keys. More specifically,
we concluded that there should be a distinction between those mechanisms deployed for
communicated data and those used for archived data. These differing requirements, and
the fact that most of the existing mechanisms were designed for communicated data,
have motivated a study of the use of existing key recovery mechanisms for archived
data. This study showed that these mechanisms might not constitute an ideal solution
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when they are used on archived data.
Among the plethora of existing key recovery mechanisms is the one proposed by Maher
in [53]. Although this mechanism has been designed to be used on archived data, it does
not satisfy all the requirements identified in this thesis. More specifically, although the
mechanism has the advantage that it does not require an on-line agent (unlike many key
escrow mechanisms), it has the disadvantage that is vulnerable to rogue user attacks. A
rogue user can alter or delete the generated key recovery information, thus preventing
authorised recovery of the decryption key. This is one of the problems that we identified
as a weak point of most existing key recovery mechanisms when applied to archived
data.
The other problem that existing key recovery mechanisms face is that they do not
offer the user the ability to recover his keys on his own, thus forcing the user either
to keep a backup of these keys locally or to contact his agent whenever access to
encrypted data is required. The first approach might introduce problems associated
with the management and protection of the backup of keys, while the second introduces
a communication overhead, and might also lead to an inability to access the required
keys if the communications channel between the user and the agent is not available.
Given the lack of mechanisms that can be used for encrypted data, the design of a
mechanism that can efficiently overcome the two aforementioned problems is highly
desirable. As a result, two new schemes were proposed that fulfil the requirements
identified for a key recovery mechanism used with archived data. Both mechanisms
give the user the ability to recover his keys without the agent’s intervention, while
being robust against certain rogue user attacks. More specifically, we assume that
in an attempt to bypass the key recovery functionality a rogue user might alter or
delete the generated key recovery information, or even prohibit its generation. It is
very difficult to prevent attacks where a rogue user deploys his own cryptographic
mechanisms to encrypt his data.
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The two proposed mechanisms prevent rogue user attacks by different means. The first
imposes a residual work factor on the agent recovering the keys when a rogue user
deletes the generated key recovery information. That is, the agent will have to recover
the required key through a trial-and-report technique. The other mechanism requires
the agent’s participation during key generation and mandates the use of smart cards.
The agent can be external to the corporation without endangering the secrecy of the
keys.
The feasibility of deployment of the first mechanism was studied by implementing it
using a Giesecke&Devrient Sm@rtCafe´ Java Card. One finding from this prototype
implementation is that bulk data encryption on the card is still a prohibitively time-
consuming operation. With current technology it is thus most appropriate to use the
card for key generation, while encryption takes place on another platform, such as a
PC. Secure messaging between the card and the PC, and certain integrity checks on
the software that runs on the PC, are two techniques that can help ensure that a rogue
user will not alter the key after its generation to prevent authorised recovery of his
keys.
Another major theme of this thesis was the investigation of interoperability issues that
arise from the use of dissimilar key recovery mechanisms in encrypted communications.
It is likely that the use of dissimilar mechanisms will force communicating parties either
to abandon the establishment of a secure communication or not to use key recovery.
Both situations introduce potential problems, with the first case leading to a denial of
service, and the second giving rise to potential data loss through lack of a key recovery
capability.
The investigation of interoperability issues was performed in parallel with similar work
carried out by the Key Recovery Alliance. One of the outcomes of this latter work
was the proposal of the ‘Common Key Recovery Block Format’ designed to enable
interoperation between dissimilar mechanisms. Detailed study, however, showed that
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the Key Recovery Alliance scheme fails to achieve one of its main objectives, and that
it is not always applicable. The varying properties of existing key recovery mechanisms
render a single model solution, such as the one proposed by the Key Recovery Alliance,
inappropriate for use on every mechanism.
Instead, we proposed a simpler approach where the two entities negotiate the key
recovery mechanism(s) to be used in the encrypted communications. Negotiation of
cryptographic parameters is an approach that has been empirically proven to work
efficiently in environments where there is a variety of incompatible mechanisms avail-
able. Following this model, we proposed a protocol where the two parties can negotiate
the key recovery mechanism(s) to be used, with the ultimate goal of agreeing on a
mutually acceptable mechanism or on different, yet interoperable, mechanisms. The
proposed protocol can be used to provide key recovery functionality at the application
layer in contrast to a protocol proposed by the Key Recovery Alliance, which targets
the IP layer. Note also that because the latter approach uses the Common Key Recov-
ery Block Format mechanism, it suffers from the problems already identified with this
mechanism.
Another issue that has been investigated within this thesis is the prevention of unfair
key recovery by either of the parties in an encrypted communication. A protocol to
enable ‘fair key agreement’ in one of the standardised mechanisms in ISO/IEC 11770-3
[38] was given. This protocol can also serve two additional purposes; it can be used
as a fair certification protocol for Diffie-Hellman keys, and can also be used to prevent
unfair key recovery. The term “fair certification” is used to describe the issue of public
key certificates by a certification authority where the subject cannot choose his private
key, and hence prevent unfair key agreement, while the private key is not disclosed to
the certification authority. Unfair key recovery is used to describe the situation where
one of the communicating parties chooses part of the negotiated session key, and hence
enables a covert channel for recovery of this key by another entity. This would typically
be an undesirable situation for the other party, especially in environments where the
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two entities agree not to use key recovery.
Although, as already mentioned, this thesis is primarily concerned with the use of key
recovery in a business environment, the last main section was devoted to the addition of
a key recovery capability to one of the authentication protocols designed in the context
of third generation mobile communications. This work was motivated by the possibility
that governments would require future mobile telecommunications protocols to provide
for warranted access to encryption keys. The proposed modifications were designed
to protect users against unauthorised access to their communications. Access to user
decryption keys is restricted to those protecting data to which the requesting entity is
authorised to have access.
10.2 Discussion and suggestions for future work
One of the problems that the work carried out for this thesis has faced is the lack of
standardisation for key recovery mechanisms. The existence of a plethora of proprietary
key recovery schemes proposed by industry and academia, with no standards, presents
a challenging problem to future users of key recovery techniques.
This problem becomes worse when one considers the interoperability issues that arise
from the use of dissimilar mechanisms. Dealing with interoperability problems between
non-standardised key recovery mechanisms requires consideration of the properties of
the majority, if not all, of the existing schemes. This process would be much easier
if the wide spectrum of key recovery schemes could be reduced to a small number of
standardised mechanisms.
The adoption of some of the existing mechanisms as de facto standards does not nec-
essarily imply that there is no need to take further action. It is vital to check the
soundness of these mechanisms before they start being used extensively.
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Although the Key Recovery Alliance has worked on the standardisation of key recov-
ery mechanisms and on issues related to their deployment, the alliance was dissolved
without having the results adopted by any of the existing standardisation bodies. One
way of progressing standardisation efforts would be to put the negotiation protocol
proposed in this thesis forward for adoption by an appropriate body such as the IETF.
We believe that such an action, in conjunction with the work that has been presented
in this thesis, would help to raise the awareness of the need for standardisation in this
area.
It would appear that the general suspicion of research on key recovery, which mainly re-
sults from potential government requirements for access to encrypted communications,
is holding back progress on key recovery mechanisms and their use in a business envi-
ronment. Unless the benefits of the use of key recovery in the commercial environment
are better understood, companies are likely to continue using proprietary mechanisms.
Key recovery will potentially continue to be an issue that experts will be reluctant to
talk about, yet many cryptographic products will transparently use it.
As the use of IT continues to advance, the threats that corporations will face from
disgruntled employees are likely to increase. The deployment of key recovery, however,
is not just a countermeasure to these threats. Key recovery is a security mechanism
that can work to the benefit of both users and corporations. It can encourage employees
to use encryption, which is vital for the protection of information, and it can also give
businesses continuous access to their encrypted data, as well as access to their encrypted
communications. In the future we expect that key recovery will be widely seen as a








*** Royal Holloway University of London ***
*** Information Security Group ***
*****************************************************************
FILE NAME : KeyRecDeclarations
CLASS : KeyRecApplet
PACKAGE : keyrecovery
AUTHOR : Konstantinos Rantos 10
DATE : May 2000
DESCRIPTION : Part of the Applet. Declarations of the CLA and





// codes of CLA byte in the command APDU header 20
final static byte KeyRec CLA =(byte)0xB0;
final static byte ISO CLA = (byte)0x00;
// codes of INS byte in the command APDU header
final static byte VERIFY = (byte) 0x20;
final static byte EncryptFile = (byte) 0x50;
final static byte DecryptFile = (byte) 0x60;
// maximum number of incorrect tries before the
// PIN is blocked 30
final static byte PinTryLimit =(byte)0x03;
// maximum size PIN
final static byte MaxPinSize =(byte)0x04;
// status word (SW1-SW2) to signal that PIN verification has failed
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public class KeyRec implements KeyRecDeclarations{
/* Constants declarations */
static byte PIN VALUE[ ] ={0x34,0x33,0x32,0x31};
protected OwnerPIN pin;
//The following are dummy values used for the user’s and agent key pairs
private short userprivate = (short) 21; 30
private short userpublic = (short) 285;
public short agentpublic = (short) 251; //the corresponding private is 16;
private short keycomponent = (short) 89;
private byte[ ] buffertobehashed;
private byte[ ] m hashedbuffer;
private CipherECB m cipherECB;
private MessageDigest m sha1alg;
private SymmetricKey m ECBkey; 40
public KeyRec() {
JCSystem.makeTransientShortArray( (short) 1, JCSystem.CLEAR ON DESELECT );
buffertobehashed = new byte[8];
m hashedbuffer = new byte[20];
50
m cipherECB = CipherECB.getInstance(Cipher.ENGINE DES);
m ECBkey = new SymmetricKey((short) 0x08, JCSystem.CLEAR ON DESELECT );
m sha1alg = MessageDigest.getInstance(MessageDigest.ENGINE SHA1);




pin.update( PIN VALUE, (short)(0), (byte)(4));
}
//The generatehashdata() function prepares the data that will be used 60
//by the generatekey() function for key generation
public byte[ ] generatehashdata(byte[ ] m buffer){
//put the exponentiation g^xy mod p into the beggining
//of the buffertobehashed array
Util.setShort(buffertobehashed, (short) 0x00, (short) keycomponent);
//Concatenate the ‘‘data credentials’’ contained in the m buffer
Util.arrayCopy(m buffer, ISO7816.OFFSET CDATA, buffertobehashed,




//The generatekey() function provides the key for the file encryption.
public byte[ ] generatekey(byte[ ] m buffer) {
m sha1alg.generateDigest(generatehashdata(m buffer), (short) 0x00,




//The encryptdecrypt() function encrypts/decrypts ‘‘bytestoencrypt’’ bytes of data
//found in m buffer. The data to be encrypted/decrypted are positioned after the
//‘‘data credentials’’ at the m inoffset position of the m buffer.
//‘‘encordec’’ denotes whether the data are to be encrypted or decrypted.
public byte[ ] encryptdecrypt(boolean encordec, byte[ ] m buffer, short m inoffset,
short bytestoencrypt, boolean generatenewkey) { 90
if ( ! pin.isValidated() )
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW PIN REQUIRED);
if(generatenewkey)
m ECBkey.setValue(generatekey(m buffer), (short) 0x00, (short) 0x08);
m cipherECB.setKey(m ECBkey);
if (encordec)
m cipherECB.encrypt(m buffer, m inoffset, bytestoencrypt, 100
m buffer, (short) 0x00, RunCipher.PADDING ISO00);
else
m cipherECB.decrypt(m buffer, m inoffset, bytestoencrypt,
m buffer, (short) 0x00);
return(m buffer);
} // end encryptdecrypt()
public void VerifyPIN(byte[ ] m buffer, byte m byteRead) {
// validate pin provided by the user 110
if (pin.check(m buffer, (short) ISO7816.OFFSET CDATA, m byteRead) == true)
return;
// If the PIN check failed, throw the apropiate ISOException.
short sTries = pin.getTriesRemaining();
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ISOException.throwIt( (short) (SW PIN FAILED + sTries) );
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public class KeyRecApplet extends Applet implements KeyRecDeclarations{ 20
/* Constants declarations */
private KeyRec m AppletKeyRec;
private byte buffer[ ]; // APDU buffer
public static void install(byte[ ] buffer, short offset, byte length){
new KeyRecApplet();
} // end of install method
//Constructor for KeyRecApplet 30
private KeyRecApplet() {
// create a KeyRec applet instance
m AppletKeyRec = new KeyRec();
register();
} // end of the constructor
public boolean select() {
return true;
}// end of select() method
40
public void process(APDU apdu) {
if( selectingApplet() )
return;
// APDU object carries a byte array (buffer) to
// transfer incoming and outgoing APDU header
// and data bytes between card and CAD
buffer = apdu.getBuffer();
// check whether the applet can accept the incoming APDU message
if (buffer[ ISO7816.OFFSET CLA] != KeyRec CLA & 50
buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET CLA] != ISO CLA)






switch (buffer[ ISO7816.OFFSET INS])
{
case VERIFY: {
// retrieve the PIN for validation. 60
byte byteRead = (byte)(apdu.setIncomingAndReceive());
m AppletKeyRec.VerifyPIN(buffer, byteRead);return;
}
default: ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW INS NOT SUPPORTED);
}break;
case KeyRec CLA:
switch (buffer[ ISO7816.OFFSET INS])
{
case EncryptFile: { 70
// Lc byte denotes the number of bytes in the
// data field of the comamnd APDU
short numBytes = (short) (buffer[ ISO7816.OFFSET LC] & 0x00FF);
// indicate that this APDU has incoming data and
// receive data starting from the offset ISO.OFFSET CDATA
short byteRead = (short)(apdu.setIncomingAndReceive());
// it is an error if the number of data bytes
// read does not match the number in Lc byte
if (byteRead != numBytes)
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW WRONG LENGTH); 80
if (buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET P1] == (byte) 1)
//generate new key
Util.arrayCopy(m AppletKeyRec.encryptdecrypt(true, buffer,
(short) (ISO7816.OFFSET CDATA + 0x06),
(short) (byteRead − 0x06), true),(short) 0x00, buffer,
(short) 0x00, (short) (byteRead − 0x06));
else
//use the generated from the previous transaction key
Util.arrayCopy(m AppletKeyRec.encryptdecrypt(true, buffer, 90
(short) (ISO7816.OFFSET CDATA + 0x06),
(short) (byteRead − 0x06), false), (short) 0x00, buffer,
(short) 0x00, (short) (byteRead − 0x06));
apdu.setOutgoing();
//indicate the number of bytes in the data field
if ( (byteRead − 0x06) % (short)8 != 0) {
apdu.setOutgoingLength((short)((((byteRead − 0x06)/8)+1)*8));




apdu.sendBytes((short)0, (short) (byteRead − 0x06));
}
return;
} //end case EncryptFile
case DecryptFile: {
// Lc byte denotes the number of bytes in the
// data field of the comamnd APDU 110
short numBytes = (short) (buffer[ ISO7816.OFFSET LC] & 0x00FF);
// indicate that this APDU has incoming data and
// receive data starting from the offset
// ISO.OFFSET CDATA
short byteRead = (short)(apdu.setIncomingAndReceive());
170
A.3 KeyRecApplet
// it is an error if the number of data bytes
// read does not match the number in Lc byte
if (byteRead != numBytes)
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW WRONG LENGTH);
120
if (buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET P1] == (byte) 1)
//generate new key
Util.arrayCopy(m AppletKeyRec.encryptdecrypt(false, buffer,
(short) (ISO7816.OFFSET CDATA + 0x06),
(short) (byteRead − 0x06), true), (short) 0x00, buffer,
(short) 0x00, (short) (byteRead − 0x06));
else
// use the generated from the previous transaction key
Util.arrayCopy(m AppletKeyRec.encryptdecrypt(false, buffer,
(short) (ISO7816.OFFSET CDATA + 0x06), 130
(short) (byteRead − 0x06), false), (short) 0x00, buffer,
(short) 0x00, (short) (byteRead − 0x06));
apdu.setOutgoing();
//indicate the number of bytes in the data field
apdu.setOutgoingLength((short)(byteRead−0x06));
apdu.sendBytes((short)0, (short) (byteRead − 0x06));
return;
} // end case DecryptFile
140
default: ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW INS NOT SUPPORTED);
}
}
} // end of process method
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*****************************************************************
FILE NAME : KRAppletProxy
CLASS : KRAppletProxy
PACKAGE : services
AUTHOR : Konstantinos Rantos 10
DATE : May 2000
DESCRIPTION : Part of the client. Contains the implementation
of the two main functions provided by that service,

























// KRAppletProxy is a Card Applet Proxy for the KeyRecovApplet.
public class KRAppletProxy extends SmartCafeService
implements KeyRecovApplet
{
public static final ApplicationID KEYREC APPLET AID =
new ApplicationID( "KeyRecApplet".getBytes() );
private Tracer tracer;
private static final String where = KRAppletProxy.class.getName(); 50
private static final byte[ ] bzero4 = { (byte)0, (byte)0, (byte)0, (byte)0 };
private static final byte[ ] bzero8 = { (byte)0, (byte)0, (byte)0, (byte)0,




tracer = new Tracer(this, KRAppletProxy.class);
} // end KRAppletProxy()
protected void initialize(CardServiceScheduler scheduler, 60
SmartCard card, boolean blocking)
throws CardServiceException{
super.initialize( scheduler, card, blocking );
try {
allocateCardChannel();
CardChannel channel = getCardChannel();
Hashtable ht = (Hashtable)(channel.getState());
if( ht == null ) {
ht = new Hashtable(); 70
channel.setState( ht );
}
KRAppletState state = (KRAppletState)(ht.get( KEYREC APPLET AID ));
if( state == null ) {
state = new KRAppletState();






} // end initialize().












m generatekey = (byte) 0x01;
else 100
m generatekey = (byte) 0x00;
CommandAPDU cmd = new CommandAPDU(5 + keycredentials.length +
datatoencrypt.length +1);
cmd.append( new byte[ ]{ KeyRecDeclarations.KeyRec CLA, // CLA.
KeyRecDeclarations.EncryptFile, // INS.
m generatekey, // P1.
(byte)0x00, // P2.







ResponseAPDU rsp = sendCommandAPDU(getCardChannel(), KEYREC APPLET AID, cmd);
int sw = rsp.sw();




( where + "::encrypt: " + "Unexpected response, SW = "
+ Hex.short2hex( (short)(sw & 0x0000FFFF) ) );
}
catch( CardTerminalException x ) {






} // end encryptfile()












m generatekey = (byte) 0x01;
else 150
m generatekey = (byte) 0x00;
CommandAPDU cmd = new CommandAPDU(5 + keycredentials.length +
datatodecrypt.length + 1);
cmd.append( new byte[ ]{ KeyRecDeclarations.KeyRec CLA, // CLA.
KeyRecDeclarations.DecryptFile, // INS.
m generatekey, // P1.
(byte)0x00, // P2.





ResponseAPDU rsp = sendCommandAPDU( getCardChannel(), KEYREC APPLET AID, cmd );
int sw = rsp.sw();




( where + "::decrypt: " + "Unexpected response, SW = "




catch( CardTerminalException x ) {






} // end decryptfile()
/**
* Performs Card Holder Verification.
*
* The p bNumCHV parameter can be used for the case that more than one
* types of PINs used. For instance an administrator PIN can be used
* which can give the user privileged access to the card. 190
**/







byte bLength = 4;
200
String message = new String();
if(p bNumCHV == 1)
message = " Please enter " +
" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION PIN " +
" ";
CommandAPDU cmd = new CommandAPDU( 5 + bLength + 1 );
cmd.append( new byte[ ]{ KeyRecDeclarations.ISO CLA, // CLA.
KeyRecDeclarations.VERIFY, // INS. 210
(byte)0x20, // P1.
(byte)(0x80 | p bNumCHV), // P2.
bLength } ); // Lc.
cmd.append( bzero4 ); // Data.
CardTerminalIOControl ioCtrl = new CardTerminalIOControl( bLength, 30, null, null );




ResponseAPDU rsp = sendVerifiedAPDU( p channel, KEYREC APPLET AID, cmd,
chvCtrl, getCHVDialog(), 30000 );
int sw = rsp.sw();
if( sw == 0x9000 )
{








( "PIN verification failed, "
+ (sw & 0x000F)
+ " retries remaining." );
else
throw new CardServiceUnexpectedResponseException
( where + "::verify: " 240
+ "Unexpected response, SW = "





Hashtable ht = (Hashtable)(getCardChannel().getState());
KRAppletState state = (KRAppletState)(ht.get( KEYREC APPLET AID )); 250
if( state == null )
throw new CardServiceException
( where + "::getCardState: "










catch (CardServiceException x) {};
} // ’SmartCafeService.appletSelected()’.
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*****************************************************************
FILE NAME : KRAppletState
CLASS : KRAppletState
PACKAGE : services
AUTHOR : Konstantinos Rantos 10
DATE : May 2000
DESCRIPTION : Part of the client. Represents the state
of the key recovery applet on the card
****************************************************************/
package services;
public class KRAppletState {
/* Constants to indicate which type of CHV is performed. */ 20
public static final byte ENCRYPT CHV = 1;
public static final byte ADMIN CHV = 3;
/* Which type of successful card holder verification
has been performed last. This is for the case that
administrator functionality is implemented on the card. */
protected boolean m zEncryptCHVPerformed = false;
protected boolean m zAdminCHVPerformed = false;
30
/*
* Check if encrypt operations are allowed.
* return true if allowed, false otherwise.
*/




* Check if PIN administration operations are allowed. 40
* return true if allowed, false otherwise.
*/




* Sets the card holder verification flag to the given value.
* param p bCHVType Indicates which type of CHV has been performed
* param p zCHVPerformed Indicates whether a successful 50
* card holder verification has been performed.
*/







m zEncryptCHVPerformed = p zCHVPerformed;
break;
case ADMIN CHV: 60




/* Reset the state of the key recovery applet. */
public void resetState() {
m zEncryptCHVPerformed = false;
m zAdminCHVPerformed = false;
} // KRAppletState.resetState() 70





*** Royal Holloway University of London ***
*** Information Security Group ***
*****************************************************************
FILE NAME : KeyRecovApplet
CLASS : KeyRecovApplet
PACKAGE : services
AUTHOR : Konstantinos Rantos 10
DATE : May 2000
DESCRIPTION : Part of the client. Contains the interface










public interface KeyRecovApplet extends CardServiceInterface{










} // interface ’KeyRecovApplet’. 40
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